The late Carlos Fuentes, the renowned Mexican author, once called Hugo Chávez a “tropical Mussolini.” Despite their differences, both Chávez and Mussolini began their political journeys with a socialist agenda, had remarkable rhetorical talents, capitalized on public discontent and cleverly dismantled their countries’ democratic institutions. Chávez’s death in March 2013 brought his handpicked successor, Nicolás Maduro, to power.
Maduro lacks Chávez’s charisma and political skills, but has nevertheless consolidated his power, emulating his predecessor’s disregard for the fragile democratic institutions still left to provide checks and balances. Maduro’s administration has been characterized by a continuation of political mismanagement, a rise in violence and crime, corruption, and an economic crisis evidenced by shortages of food, medicine and electricity. Like Chávez, Maduro demonizes government opponents, further polarizing the country’s already divided population. The administration’s inefficiencies and missteps, coupled with a sharp drop in oil revenues, made it possible for an opposition coalition to win the majority of seats in last December’s congressional election. After more than a decade of political marginalization, the opposition took control of the National Assembly in January.
This glimpse of hope for Venezuelans was short-lived. The Supreme Court, which is filled with Maduro loyalists, overturned several progressive laws approved by the National Assembly; it was a demoralizing blow to lawmakers and the population that elected them in the hope of bringing change. What’s more, members of congress haven’t been paid for four months — Maduro has ordered the Treasury and the Finance Ministry to suspend their salaries.
Last week, Venezuela’s Supreme Court delivered another discouraging setback. It ruled in favor of Maduro’s petition to have the country’s 2017 budget approved by the Court’s constitutional chamber instead of the National Assembly. The Supreme Court’s justification: Just days after the new National Assembly convened for the first time, the Court declared legislators in contempt — thus any of their laws are considered unconstitutional. National Assembly members were held in contempt for allowing four legislators from the Amazon region – three of whom oppose the government — to be reinstated after the Court had suspended them, alleging electoral fraud. Reinstating the congressmen was particularly important because it gave the opposition the two-thirds majority needed to approve important measures, such as a recall referendum of the president’s mandate.
The Court also cited the country’s economic crisis as another reason to circumvent the National Assembly’s authority to approve the national budget. Last Friday, following the Supreme Court’s ruling, Maduro presented the budget to the Court’s constitutional chamber by decree.
This week, the opposition actively sought to collect the four million signatures required for a recall referendum on Maduro. If a referendum is held in 2016 and approved, presidential elections would have to take place. If the vote is postponed until 2017 and approved, however, the only change would be that Maduro’s vice president would replace him. The former outcome appears doubtful, as Venezuela’s national electoral council (Consejo Nacional Electoral) on Thursday suspended the recall drive, alleging fraud in a preliminary signature-gathering attempt.
In the meantime, Venezuela’s downward spiral has yet to reach bottom. The national oil company (PDVSA) has seen steep declines in production since 2014 and oil prices remain low. The International Monetary Fund estimates Venezuela’s inflation in 2017 will reach 1,640 percent and GDP will contract by 4.5 percent. Chávez’s Bolivarian socialism was in part made possible by a fortunate confluence of circumstances: a functional PDVSA and a rise in oil prices from $10 per barrel in 1999 when he first took office to $126 per barrel at its peak in 2008. Maduro, in contrast, was dealt a very different hand. Despite his mounting efforts to hang on to power and run the country like the tropical Mussolini, Venezuela’s economic and social realities are a ticking time bomb. When the day comes, the next president will be left with the aftermath of an economic, social and political explosion that will take years to fix.
Erika de la Garza is the program director of the Latin America Initiative at the Baker Institute. Her chief areas of interest include U.S.-Latin American relations, emerging leadership, coalition building between public, private and civil society actors, and trade and business development in Latin America.