In the days that followed Mexico’s July 1 presidential election, members of the world political class rushed to congratulate Enrique Peña Nieto, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) candidate who won with just 38 percent of the vote. The PRI — defeated in 2000 after 70 years in power — was quick to pronounce itself a “new” (i.e., reformed) party. Peña Nieto was also eager to move on, and soon began to discuss his plans for Mexico and a U.S.-Mexico binational agenda.
President-elect Enrique Peña Nieto of Mexico
But the post-election honeymoon was not to last. First, the leftist Revolutionary Democratic Party (PRD) candidate, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, contested Peña’s victory on the grounds that the PRI had bought votes and exceeded campaign spending limits. Also clouding the picture was the PRI’s inability to win a majority in Congress. This gives opposition parties bargaining power — particularly the political left, which managed first and second place finishes in 13 of Mexico’s 32 states. These developments, along with the fact that nearly two-thirds of Mexico’s voters rejected Peña Nieto’s candidacy, complicate not only the transition in Mexico but also the prospects for a Mexico-U.S. binational agenda that satisfies both countries.
Given this complex post-election scenario, it is worth assessing the binational agenda today and in the upcoming Peña Nieto administration. What can be accomplished will depend on developments in the United States and in Mexico — as well as the political skills of the Peña administration, or his political team, given that his public appearances, when not scripted and carefully managed, have shown him to be somewhat of an intellectual lightweight. In any event, the United States seems to have a set of priorities that it is interested in pushing onto Mexico’s political agenda. At the top of the list are curbing illegal drug trafficking and undocumented immigration, fighting corruption and increasing market competition.
Peña Nieto has given assurances that he does not support the legalization of drugs, and that he intends to continue a military assault on criminal cartels, improve police performance by creating special anti-drug militias, and cooperate with the United States in counter-drug efforts. But what is politically possible is another matter. The priority in Mexico is to reduce violence. The military has proven effective in tactical operations against the cartels, but its record on due process and human rights has been disastrous. Peña Nieto cannot improve police performance overnight, and special anti-drug forces have been tried before without success. There are no new ideas here, but there is a new focus on reducing violence in Mexico that may not align with the U.S. agenda.
On the issue of undocumented migration, Peña Nieto has made it clear that the status of Mexicans in the United States is a priority. This is not new, either. Mexico has made the status of nearly seven million undocumented Mexicans a priority for 12 years, with little progress. The United States insists that immigration is a strictly domestic matter that is not open to negotiation with Mexico. Mexico has also been unable to stop undocumented migration from Central America and is incapable of protecting Central American migrants traveling through Mexico to the United States. As much as the United States would like Mexico to close its southern border, Mexico’s political left will make it impossible for Peña Nieto to act to stop the flow of migrants through Mexico. Such a move would be viewed in Mexico as a disgraceful, and would further alienate Mexico from its Central American neighbors — a relationship that Peña has promised to restore.
Fighting corruption is one of the acknowledged items on the binational agenda. Corruption in Mexico has become systemic and extends to the police, the judicial system, the financial system, and, as the Mexican left is trying to demonstrate, to the political system. It is so endemic now that the United States has clearly recognized that Mexico must do something about it. But for Peña Nieto, fighting corruption is not an easy task. First, he is himself accused of corruption; whatever happens as a result of the post-election allegations against him, he will have been branded and weakened by the electoral scandal that followed his victory at the polls. Second, the support behind his candidacy came primarily from Mexico’s political class — current and former governors, mayors and members of Congress, mostly members of his party, many of whom are accused of the many acts of corruption that the United States is aware of. Fighting corruption means that Peña Nieto would have to abandon his gratitude to this group and make corruption a thing of the past. It is unlikely that Peña Nieto will have the political will to punish his own support base. Doing so would also mean weakening his own party even further, which he is not likely to do.
Finally, the United States is fully aware of the uncompetitive business environment in Mexico, where monopolies reign supreme. Many American companies are unable to make inroads into the Mexican market, particularly in the energy and telecommunications sectors. Peña Nieto is not likely to touch the structure of monopolies, either, given that his party is deeply engaged with the very monopolies it created during the privatization of the economy in the 1980s and 1990s. Thus, the question is the same: Will Peña Nieto have the political will to pursue policies that counter the interests of monopolies?
In all, the political constraints that run through a politically divided country, a set of entrenched interests, and Peña Nieto’s own political and intellectual limitations are enormous. The United States and Mexico are not likely to see eye-to-eye on any of the important issues discussed above, although they will continue to pretend they do. Even if Peña Nieto manages to pass a number of important structural reforms, most will be diluted by his political weakness and his indebtedness to the powerful interests that rule Mexico. Thus, the forecast for Mexico-U.S. relations continues to call for painfully slow progress and continued disagreement papered over by polite diplomacy, mutual reassurances of respect, and cooperation in fits and starts. Change? Hardly.
Tony Payan is the Baker Institute Scholar for Immigration Studies.