Can we expect any major departures in foreign policy during President Obama’s second term? Probably not.
Despite claims to the contrary by supporters and opponents alike, Obama’s first-term foreign policy was fairly conventional. Indeed, much of it was marked by continuity with the second term of his predecessor; after a disastrous period of overreach during the first term, Bush foreign policy had become much more sober by Barack Obama’s inauguration in January 2009.
There were a few areas where Obama embarked on new initiatives: the “reset” with Russia; the intervention in Libya; the surge in Afghanistan. Some were successes, like the reset, which yielded a significant new arms control treaty with Russia. Others were failures, such as the surge, which — at high human and financial cost — has merely deferred the day we will terminate our ill-fated adventure in Central Asian nation-building. Some of Obama’s initiatives are more ambiguous in their consequences, like our intervention in Libya, which succeeded in helping topple dictator Moammar Gadhafi but also fostered instability in Mali and, indirectly, Algeria.
Certainly, nothing about Obama’s choices to head his second–term foreign policy team suggests that major strategic changes are afoot. Chuck Hagel, the president’s pick to head the Department of Defense, is a traditional Republican internationalist; the opposition to him among some in the GOP merely reveals the extent to which neoconservatives have captured the party’s foreign policy thinking. There are few signs that John Kerry, as secretary of state, will break sharply with his predecessor, Hillary Clinton. John Brennan’s proposed move to the head of the CIA again reflects continuity, rather than change; after all, Brennan has been Obama’s homeland security adviser — and chief architect of our drone program — for four years.
At one level, continuity is not such a bad thing. After all, the last time the United States made a dramatic change in our foreign policy — by launching a major war of choice against Iraq — the results were disastrous. And the challenges confronting the United States in the international arena, though real, are not amenable to dramatic new initiatives on practical or political grounds.
For instance, Obama’s options in Afghanistan are constrained by repeated public commitments to terminating our ill-advised and unpopular military presence there. Our policy toward Iran has taken on a life of its own, with neither side willing to back down, though Obama, to his credit, appears wary of launching a military strike of uncertain success and unpredictable consequences. What of the Arab-Israeli peace process, now on life support? Obama might make token efforts to revive talks but is most unlikely to expend the domestic political capital necessary to force concessions from Israel. Our broader policy toward the Middle East will remain an uneasy mix of public calls for democracy and implicit support for autocrats who serve our purposes. Our rhetoric may strike the inhabitants of the Middle East as hollow, even hypocritical. But our leaders appear incapable of restraining it. And we can look forward to more U.S. invocations of the importance of democracy in the Middle East even as we make common cause — albeit on compelling strategic grounds — with some of the region’s staunchest anti-democratic governments.
Outside the Muslim world, we can also expect broad continuity. Though there are welcome signs that our domestic debate on drug legalization is finally showing signs of life, the Obama administration is unlikely to relent in our international war on drugs. Latin Americans, in particular, will continue to die in large numbers because the United States is incapable of addressing — through law enforcement, education or treatment — the fact that many citizens choose to use illegal drugs. Europe’s ongoing problem s— in terms of poor economic performance and inadequate governance — are largely beyond U.S. influence. China will continue to present a quandary to U.S. policymakers: it is both a major current trading partner and potential future rival. And we may expect the Obama administration to continue what might be called a “hedging strategy” that both emphasizes increased cooperation with Beijing and the cultivation of countries, like India, which might in the future serve as an important partner in constraining China’s ambitions.
There is one area where we might see a change, at least in emphasis. The Obama administration could give a higher priority to negotiating bilateral and perhaps regional trade agreements in Latin America and around the Pacific Rim. If other second-term presidents are any guide, Obama will be eager to create a legacy. Expanded trade and investment is one area where he might do so — and one, moreover, where he will find significant support among congressional Republicans.
None of this is to say that we can look forward to an unexciting period in U.S. foreign policy. We can expect any number of crises — as dramatic as they are largely unpredictable — that may rock the international status quo and drive U.S. foreign policy in new directions. Such events have occurred in the past: the overthrow of the Shah, the sudden collapse of the Soviet Empire, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, and — most shockingly — the attacks of September 11, 2011. And they will no doubt occur in the future.
Joe Barnes is the Baker Institute’s Bonner Means Baker Fellow. From 1979 to 1993, he was a career diplomat with the U.S. Department of State, serving in Europe, Africa, the Middle East and South Asia.