Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense. Shaft and dual propellers of the North Korean CHT-02D torpedo dredged from the shallow waters of the Yellow Sea near Baengnyeong Island.
On May 20, 2010, nearly two months after the sinking of Republic of Korea Navy warship Cheonan, came a definitive report from the South Korean government as to the cause of her sinking. The Cheonan, which exploded and sank in approximately eight minutes, taking the lives of 46 sailors, was sent to the bottom of the Yellow Sea by a North Korean homing torpedo, according to a panel of experts from Australia, Canada, Great Britain, South Korea and the United States. More than a week later, the international community is still grappling with exactly what it can do to punish North Korea for engaging in an act of war, while at the same time not triggering the collapse of the North or renewed hostilities between the two Koreas.
There are many questions to be covered. Why is the South sure it was a North Korean torpedo? What was the logic behind the sinking? And finally, what are the possible options in the requisite diplomacy needed to restabilize the truce on the Korean peninsula?
First, we need to understand why the torpedo explanation and evidence are a good fit. This has a lot to do with two items: the signature of the damage inflicted on the Cheonan and the hard evidence collected by dredging the waters off Baengnyeong Island. For at least a month, South Korea defense officials hinted that a torpedo attack was the likely cause of the sinking. That the Cheonan split into two pieces and sank quickly is consistent with the method by which modern torpedoes kill. Current generation homing torpedoes don’t strike the ship, but rather explode beneath it, creating a bubble of air that pushes the vessel out of the water, breaking its keel. This was just a good theory until last week when the South Koreans showed the world the propeller and steering mechanism for a North Korean CHT-02D homing torpedo.
As the Economist stated:
Whoever failed to erase the words “Number One” in blue Korean script etched inside the propulsion shaft of a deadly torpedo may well be in deep trouble in Pyongyang. On May 15th a ship dredging the site of the attack on a South Korean warship in March that killed 46 seamen made a spectacular find: propellers, motors and a steering section that international investigators say “perfectly match” those of a CHT-02D torpedo that North Korea sells abroad. What’s more, the blue marking was similar to one on a previously captured North Korean torpedo. This was as close to a smoking gun as the South Koreans could have hoped to find.
But why this particular attack? On that, there is no easy answer. North Korea has a long record of taking its cold war with the South hot from time to time. Its agents assassinated the wife of President Park Chung-hee in an attempt on his life in 1974. North Korean troops killed two U.S. officers in the 1976 Axe Cutting Incident at the DMZ. In 1983, North Korean agents killed approximately half the South Korean cabinet in a Rangoon bombing in an attempt on President Chun Doo-hwan’s life. Other agents left a time bomb aboard Korea Air Flight 858, downing the plane in 1983. More recently, the North has provoked its neighbors with missile tests and likely launched a cyber attack against the South and the United States last summer. The best answer to “why” may be that the North provokes the South when it can, because it can and there are very few sticks left with which the community of nations may punish it. When the North steps out of line, ultimately it may get a carrot.
Why can the North get away with such an attack? I believe the answer to be painfully simple. Downtown Seoul is but 30 miles from the DMZ. That puts it well within range of a considerable portion of the North Korean army’s arsenal of long-range guns, rockets and ballistic missiles. More than 10 million people live in Seoul and the greater Seoul metropolitan area probably accounts for nearly a third of South Korea’s economic output. North Korea maintains highly effective deterrence on the peninsula not with nuclear or chemical weapons, but with large concentrations of artillery. Sure the South Korean and U.S. forces could eventually silence those weapons should they commence fire, but the intervening period might do enormous damage. Nobody wants to see even one neighborhood of Seoul look like Stalingrad.
What this means is that when we hear talk of getting tough on Pyongyang, the United States and South Korea can only go so far. The two countries can hold anti-submarine drills and other exercises and the United States can station additional aircraft at its bases there, but in the political-military domain, there is little that can be done. In fact, the most important political message sent to Pyongyang in the wake of the torpedo revelation was not from Washington or Seoul, but from Tokyo, which reversed its stance on an extension of operations for the U.S. forces at a marine air base on Okinawa (a move that sent a message to both Pyongyang and Beijing). Moving forward, Seoul and Washington could entertain some belligerent actions: (1) intercepting and searching North Korean vessels on the high seas; (2) blockading the North to maritime traffic; or (3) engaging in limited evacuation drills in Seoul and along the DMZ. However, any of these moves could be met with counteraction, and further destabilization of the truce.
Real action, whether in sanctions or censure of the North Koreans, will depend most upon its most important ally, China. North Korean leader Kim Jong Il just visited China and it appears the relationship remains solid. China has a lot to lose if things go badly for North Korea. A collapse of the North Korean government and military coupled with famine could send millions of refugees across the Yalu River into Manchuria, creating an enormous humanitarian crisis. South Korea, Japan and the United States would be pleased to see the Chinese support a resolution that makes life harder for the North Korean leadership, but the question remains as to what China may receive in exchange for exerting more pressure on the North or agreeing to emplace additional sanctions through the United Nations.
The simplest answer is probably China’s own reunification matter: Taiwan. Any diplomatic deal for China could involve increased concessions to diminish the flow of U.S. arms to Taipei or support of greater ties between the Mainland and what it still considers to be a breakaway province. South Korea could lend support to further talks between Beijing and Taipei or close the door to the Dalai Lama. For assistance in reining in North Korea, China will likely get something, and that’s the point. China’s assistance on North Korea will likely ultimately improve its international standing and negotiating position. So this all boils down to a question of realpolitik. Is it better for South Korea and the United States to make concessions to China on getting support in the U.N. or go it alone for now? That question has no easy answer.
Christopher Bronk is the Baker Institute fellow in technology, society and public policy. He previously served as a career diplomat with the United States Department of State on assignments both overseas and in Washington, D.C.