“German Unification: Expectations and Outcomes” panelists. From left, former U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker III; former French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas; former West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher; Lord Charles Powell, U.K. foreign policy adviser; and former East German Foreign Minister Markus Meckel. Former Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze participated via satellite
As the world marks the 20th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall, German unification may seem, in retrospect, the inevitable result of abstract historical processes. As former U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker, III, reminded us, however, “it took some very hard work.” The factors that made the process so challenging were on display Friday night at the Baker Institute, as five foreign ministers and one key foreign policy adviser came together for a remarkable panel as part of a two-day conference on “German Unification: Expectations and Outcomes.”
Joining Baker for this historic discussion were: former Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher of the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany); former Foreign Minister Roland Dumas of France; Lord Charles Powell, foreign policy adviser to former U.K. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher; former Foreign Minister Markus Meckel of the German Democratic Republic (East Germany); and, via satellite from Tbilisi, Georgia, former Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze.
The stakes in the process were high, as Shevardnadze reminded the audience. Not only were nuclear weapons armed and ready, there were also hundreds of thousands of NATO and Warsaw Pact troops in Germany. After all, there was still no final treaty ending World War II. The dignitaries on the panel all reported on their initial, and common, concern to avoid conflict; to reach some kind of peaceful outcome; and to lay the foundations for a lasting peace, in the form of institutions that would embed all the nations in a common, united Europe.
But the states had conflicting interests, and also very different styles of leadership. Traces of earlier disagreements bubbled up at several points — making for a lively discussion. Genscher remarked early in the panel on the distrust that Margaret Thatcher had for the entire notion of “German Unification”; Powell took the time to explain exactly how Thatcher’s sense of elation mingled with a generational fear about Germany. Dumas expressed his continuing preference for “Four-Plus-Two” negotiations, which would have implied a stronger role for the Allied forces in determining the fate of the two Germanies, rather than the “Two-Plus-Four” format that won out, giving the Germanies a greater say in the unification, that won out.
With German unification, Genscher noted, “a dream became a reality.” And Meckel related his own experiences growing up in East Germany, and his yearning for democracy. As Baker stated, the entire process revealed “the indomitable spirit of the people of the German Democratic Republic.”
- View a webcast of the Oct. 30, 2009 panel discussion, “German Unification: Expectations and Outcomes.”
- View the program from the panel discussion (Oct. 30, 2009) and download bios for the panel participants.
- View the program from the second day of the conference (Oct. 31, 2009) and download research from the event.
Peter C. Caldwell is a professor of history at Rice University. He is a Humboldt Fellow, and has received grants from the DAAD and the Humboldt Foundation, as well as a residential fellowship at the Center for German and European Studies at Georgetown University.