Nov. 1, 2015, marked a milestone election in recent Turkish history. Not only was it the first time that repeat elections were held in Turkey, but there was also the slim possibility that the electorate might find a way out of the gridlock that had arrested the country since the spring of 2015. There seemed to be a prospect of ending the 13-year-long AKP rule, especially in light of the party’s slowly-eroding popularity. Yet, the elections injected a new lease on life to the AKP and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The AKP nearly eclipsed its historic 2011 victory; the party won 49 percent of the votes and 317 seats, well beyond the minimum required to form a single-party majority government. The center-left CHP succeeded in showcasing yet another dull polling, securing around 25 percent of the votes and seats. Kurdish HDP secured parliamentary representation once again with close to 11 percent of the votes and 59 parliamentary seats, a feat that clearly should be recognized as an achievement in the face of violence, threats and other impediments the party faced in its electoral campaign. The nationalist MHP tanked spectacularly under Devlet Bahceli’s leadership. The party lost a quarter of its votes, dropping to 12 percent, and half of its parliamentary seats, down to 40, compared to the June 7 elections.
What explains this surprising outcome? Two factors underlie it: rising security concerns and the weakness of the opposition. While the focus of the June 7 elections was the corruption scandal that engulfed the AKP, lack of economic development, and worsening state of freedoms, the governing AKP shifted the conversation to security issues, especially on the Kurdish front. Erdogan’s political mastery got the best of both of the opposition parties and, more importantly, of the electorate. Escalating violence between PKK and the Turkish state arrested national attention, leading many to believe that the violence was spiraling out of control. Indeed, the post-June 7 period has been the deadliest episode of violence under AKP rule since 2002. The worst came on Oct. 10, when two suicide bombers carried out their attacks in the midst of a political rally led by HDP, the Kurdish party in Turkey. More than 100 people died and hundreds more were injured, making it the worst terror attack in Turkish history. Particularly critical to Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu’s handling of this terror attack was pitching PKK and HDP as the parties responsible. As ironic as this idea of “Kurds bombing Kurds” sounds, the government and the pro-AKP media persistently harped on this notion until Nov. 1.
And it worked. A public opinion survey conducted by Ipsos on Nov. 4 sheds light on the success of this tactic. Political stability and re-establishing peace accounted for the vote choice of 41 percent of AKP voters; 22 percent were motivated by the economy, while 4 percent voted based on religious values. Similarly, increasing violence helped 18 percent of the voters to either decide on which party to vote or change their earlier preferences. The Ankara bombings of Oct. 10 were instrumental for 14 percent of AKP voters to change or decide on their vote choice (in favor of AKP). Lastly, 46 percent of the respondents indicated that the first priority of the new government should be fighting terrorism or re-establishing peace. These figures demonstrate the extent to which security became the most pressing issue for many voters, attesting to the success of AKP’s post-June 7 electoral strategy.
Weakness of the opposition parties also played a significant role in the election outcome. When faced with a decision to support the incumbent party, voters evaluate the perceived aptitude of opposition parties. These parties (CHP, MHP, HDP) failed to resonate with voters in the post-June 7 period. For weeks after the June 7 election, these parties were unable to jointly field or support a candidate for the parliamentary speaker position, let alone formulate an alternative government proposal, despite the fact that they held the majority. In particular, the nationalist MHP’s moody attitude throughout the entire process cost the party dearly. At a critical time when security and stability become the major electoral issues, the AKP appeared to be the safest bet.
What can we expect in AKP’s fourth term? Despite the conciliatory messages in Davutoglu’s election night speech, there is little reason to expect improvement in the recent state of affairs. The raiding of the offices of Nokta magazine and the arrests of its two editors are harbingers of what is to come. We should observe deterioration in the rule of law, freedom of the press and other basic rights. For his own survival, Erdogan must continue censoring the media and limit rights; failure to do so would impose a greater risk of oppositional mobilization. Indeed, Erdogan will push forward with his executive presidency bid, an effort to legitimize the de facto state of affairs.
One of the thorniest issues in Turkish politics is the Kurdish issue. There is some discussion about reviving the Peace Process, which Erdogan derailed due to concerns about AKP’s parliamentary election performance. Two factors will determine the success of such an effort. On one hand, the Kurdish side will demand assurances that the AKP will carry through on the terms both parties agree upon; this is particularly critical for the Kurdish side because of AKP and Ergodan’s opportunistic approach to the Peace Process, freezing and unfreezing it as political context demands. On the other hand, the government will demand the PKK to end violence. Unless a long-term ceasefire can be ensured, the situation will remained strained and the Peace Process suspended.
Lastly, we can expect Turkish foreign policy to show greater congruence with Western policy in the Middle East, especially that of the United States. Greater involvement by Russia and Iran in Syria has pushed Turkey to align more close with the U.S.’ policy on Syria and ISIS. The fact that the AKP secured a comfortable electoral victory implies that anti-Western and anti-American rhetoric will be less pronounced and the Turkish government will face fewer electoral constraints. It is not difficult to predict that relations between Turkey and the U.S. will remain cool, particularly over various policy differences and the receding state of democratic governance in Turkey. Nonetheless, the Obama administration should continue speaking out against suppression of press freedom, rule of law and other basic human rights in recent years. The U.S. does not have access to other influential actors to express its concerns, especially when Erdogan has consolidated his power atop the Turkish political system. Yet, how far the U.S. government can push for the expansion of liberties in Turkey, and not curtail them, rests on two grounds. First, Russia and Iran’s move into the center stage of the Syrian crisis increased Turkey’s value for the United States. Second, the Incirlik Air Base remains a valuable asset for the U.S. to maintain in its regional policies, including in Syria. Hence, the U.S. stance against the authoritarian tendencies of Erdogan will likely be understated or even nonexistent, as the U.S. is bound to maintain Turkey’s support in its search for an end in Syria.
A.Kadir Yildirim is a research scholar in the Center for the Middle East.