Mustafa Akyol recently expressed his thoughts on how fatalism engulfs Islamic thinking in all spheres of life, in light of recent tragic events in the Muslim world. His recommendation for addressing this widespread problem of fatalism is a sort of Islamic revivalism. Akyol’s argument suffers from reductionism in his diagnosis of the problem, and is consequently misguided in its prognosis.
There is no denying that the Muslim world suffers from pervasive underdevelopment, repressive regimes, and teeming human suffering at all levels, particularly if one does not belong to one of the few privileged classes. The overall despondency of the Muslim world demonstrates itself best when natural or man-made calamities afflict these societies. It lays bare the woes of the Muslim world, such as in the cases of the Hajj-related incidents and the recent refugee problems.
While it is true that many in the Muslim world explain away tragic incidents as “fate” (most recently, some Saudi officials and Turkey’s President Erdogan), fatalism is neither a uniquely Muslim phenomenon nor does it actually account for the reaction of a great majority of Muslims. It is difficult to understand why that point is never raised in the argument, as even Akyol submits that contemporary Muslims “have little knowledge” of theological debates that he claims have given rise to such fatalism.
Calls for an Islamic revivalism are not new. Going as far back as the 18th and 19th centuries, many in the Muslim world have sought to uncover and remedy the root causes of the pervasive decay of the Muslim world. Oftentimes, the degeneration or weakening of Muslims’ faith was indicated as the likely cause. Consequently, addressing this problem necessitated an “Islamic” response. Islam had to be the central element of the way forward. Such calls have been made throughout the Muslim world to this day, leading, perhaps inadvertently, to a virtual rift between the sociological reality of the social, economic and political troubles faced and the “Islamic” response to them. Two problems mar this Islamic revivalism approach. First, and I put it bluntly, it is a time-tested model of failure. Many Muslims have pursued such methods for far too long and with far too little success. Most notably, for example, Erdogan’s “new Turkey” rhetoric in recent years showcases how far his policies are from finding long-lasting solutions for the problems of Turkish society. For a long while, however, Erdogan was deemed the most successful pioneer of this trade. The last few years have shown that this was infatuation with power.
Likewise, the track record of post-1979 Iran exhibits how poor the discourse on Islamic revivalism has been with its sheer absence of bona fide progress. What has been observed, rather, is simply a façade of an Islamic societal model. The outcome is farcical in that we merely witness an idolization of power and state but little else beyond that. The fundamental problems of both of these societies are still on full display; one fell victim to popular authoritarianism whereas the other is mired in the clutches of a theocratic system. Just as Olivier Roy predicted more than two decades ago, there is nothing new or different that the “Islamic” alternative can provide; it simply emulates secular and Western alternatives, albeit very poor ones at that.
Secondly, and perhaps at a deeper level, the focus on an Islamic revivalism unnecessarily confines our conception of Muslims to Islam, as if Muslims cannot, and shall not, be anything but Muslims, or that everyone who lives in Muslim-majority countries is Muslim by default. This fallacy of essentialism, ironically, is exactly what both fundamentalist Muslims such as the Salafis as well as many in the West who feel a deep suspicion of Muslims and Islam believe: they see Muslims as no more than their “Muslim-ness.” The recent public debates surrounding Republican presidential hopeful Ben Carson’s comments illustrate the point. Carson expressed his objection to a Muslim being the president on the grounds that Islam is inconsistent with the U.S. Constitution and that Muslims’ sole allegiance is to their faith. As appealing and unassuming as such reductionism appears, the fundamental problem concerns the essentialization of Muslims as a distinct species subject to a different set of rules and norms than the rest of the humankind.
Invoking “Islamic thought” and images from a distant past such as Al Khwarizmi, Avicenna or Averroes, as Akyol does, not only fails to resonate with Muslims of today but also needlessly constrains the wealth of intellectual riches Muslims can draw from a wide variety of sources in the West and the East.
Likewise, endemic in an Islamic revivalism argument is the notion that Islam is inherently superior and is capable of creating an Islamic alternative universe, ignoring all in the non-Muslim world. The Islamic revivalism argument, by extension, confounds the causal direction innate in this process. According to this logic, Islamic revivalism needs to precede a genuine material progress in the Muslim world. Religion, in other words, is the causal driver. We have no evidence that is the case. Indeed, an argument that favors religion as the primal cause of material development entirely misses the point of faith; when we approach religion instrumentally, i.e., to attain worldly benefits, the greatest disservice is committed against it.
The chief predicament that the Muslim world needs to tackle is neither fatalism nor the lack of an Islamic revival à la Protestant reformation. The Muslim world first and foremost needs to shed the pretense of superiority and the efforts to create an alternative “Islamic” universe. Such obsession with finding “Islamic” solutions to the many ills of the Muslim world obstructs attempts to understand and create genuine and effective solutions to its problems. It is high time to stop invoking Islamic imagery to explain the misfortunes of the Muslim world.
A.Kadir Yildirim, Ph.D., is a research scholar at Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy. His main research interests include democratization, political economy, political Islam, the politics of the Middle East and Turkish politics.