The latest attempt at securing a ceasefire in Gaza may have broken down, but behind-the-scenes diplomacy to resolve the conflict has once again shone a spotlight on Qatar’s mediatory role in conflict resolution. The country is attempting to restore its battered Arab Spring reputation as the ideal interlocutor that is uniquely placed to bridge divides and bring ostensible adversaries together. Thirteen months after the change of leadership in Doha, the new emir and foreign minister are adopting a far quieter, low-key approach to mediation. Eschewing the fanfare of their predecessors’ frenetic forays into the regional arena, Qatari officials are going “back to basics” and returning to the style of mediation that propelled the country to international prominence in the 2000s.
Prior to 2011, Qatari mediation in Yemen, Lebanon, Darfur and the Horn of Africa established the country as a “go-to” mediator in the Arab and Islamic world. Although the initiatives had a mixed record of success, they established a visible regional niche for the then-emir, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani, and his prime minister, Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim Al-Thani. Both men invested considerable time and effort in the various sets of negotiations and committed significant pledges of investment as a distinctly Qatari model of “business diplomacy” took hold. However, the country lacked the depth to follow up initial breakthroughs with longer-term monitoring and implementation of agreements, leaving Doha open to criticism of the growing gap between policy intent and professional capability.
During the Arab Spring, Qatari policy became more interventionist and associated with “picking winners” in transition states in North Africa and the Levant. Particularly in Egypt and Syria, Qatari support for the Muslim Brotherhood became increasingly controversial among local and regional actors who viewed the group’s ideology and objectives with deep suspicion. Aside from causing tensions with fellow Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, Qatar’s approach undermined the country’s reputation for impartiality. Rising scepticism of Qatari motives manifested themselves in Mali in 2013, when the activities of a small Qatari humanitarian team in the Islamist-controlled north became the focus of fevered speculation that Qatar was backing the rebel movement.
Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani took over from his father in June 2013 and promptly replaced Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim in a government reshuffle that saw the posts of prime minister and foreign minister split. Together with his foreign minister Khalid bin Mohammed al-Attiyah, Emir Tamim had to navigate a regional backlash against the Muslim Brotherhood and Qatar’s support for the organization. This culminated in the withdrawal of the Saudi, Emirati and Bahraini ambassadors from Doha in March 2014 amid accusations that Qatar was threatening the security and stability of the GCC. Over the same period, Qatar’s carefully-nurtured international image was also taking a series of blows from allegations relating to the 2022 soccer World Cup and the poor treatment of migrant laborers.
Two recent developments suggest that, after a difficult winter and spring, Qatari mediation is being revived in a manner that draws upon Doha’s ability to act as interlocutor. The first was Qatar’s involvement in arranging a prisoner exchange deal that saw five Taliban prisoners released into Qatari custody in return for the release of U.S. Army Sgt. Bowe Bergdahl. The late-May breakthrough occurred after months of painstaking preparation that, in the words of Secretary of State John Kerry, “exemplifies how vital our partnership with Qatar is and will remain.” In a rare convergence of activity, President Obama and Taliban head Mullah Omar both issued statements publicly thanking Emir Tamim, illustrating Qatar’s utility in serving as an intermediary for indirect negotiations and back-channel communications between sworn adversaries. It is this ability to balance relationships with a wide array of mutually antagonistic foes that gives Qatari mediation its “comparative advantage.”
Similar patterns have been evident in Qatar’s search for a mediated solution to the spiralling violence in Gaza. Qatar has been active in regional attempts to secure a ceasefire between Israel, with whom it has maintained discrete trade links, and Hamas, whose leader Khaled Meshaal has long been based in Doha. In October 2012, then-Emir Hamad became the first head of state to visit Gaza since the Hamas takeover of power there in 2007. The visit represented a symbolic breaching of Israeli and international sanctions on Gaza and resulted in a Qatari pledge to invest between $250 million and $400 million in Gaza to finance essential housing, health and infrastructure projects, although it is unclear whether and how much of the pledge materialized.
During the latest Gaza conflict, Emir Tamim and Foreign Minister al-Attiyah have engaged actively in shuttle diplomacy. Visitors to Qatar have included U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglo and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, who is thought to have met with Hamas leader Meshaal while in Doha. Emir Tamim also traveled to Ankara to meet Turkey’s prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, while al-Attiyah held extensive triangular consultations with Davutoglo and Kerry in Paris. It is difficult to determine the extent to which these talks contributed to the short-lived humanitarian ceasefire announced on July 31. The ceasefire rapidly disintegrated as both sides quickly resumed fighting, laying bare the intense mutual distrust of each side in the conflict. Secretary Kerry called al-Attiyah when news of the missing Israeli soldier broke to ask Doha to use its influence to intercede with Hamas. This illustrates one way Qatar can play an important role in coming days by conveying messages between Hamas and the international community and facilitating confidence-building measures that can move all parties closer to accepting the logic of a durable truce.
Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Ph.D., is the Baker Institute fellow for the Middle East. His research examines the changing position of Persian Gulf states in the global order, as well as the emergence of longer-term, nonmilitary challenges to regional security. He is also a visiting fellow at the LSE Middle East Centre and an associate fellow at Chatham House in the United Kingdom. Follow him on Twitter at @Dr_Ulrichsen.