After three years of civil war on its southern border, Turkey is being increasingly confronted by regional violence and a growing influx of Syrian refugees. Ankara’s policy toward Islamist rebels and its border policy have come under criticism amid a tense domestic atmosphere. Reformulating these aspects of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s Syria policy is key to easing the Syrian crisis’ strains on Turkey and responding to growing domestic concerns about the prime minister’s policies.
Erdoğan’s Syrian security policy faces challenges from the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), broader border violence resulting from spillover from its neighbor’s civil war and international criticism. ISIS’ rapid territorial gains and the June kidnapping of over 80 Turkish citizens in Iraq have heightened Ankara’s worries about the group’s impact on Turkish territory. The discovery of an ISIS cell in Saudi Arabia further spurred fears that ISIS is formally setting up operations within Turkish borders. So far, Ankara’s response to ISIS has been measured, with a media blackout on the hostage situation to avoid provoking the group while also voicing support for a unified Iraq under a new president.
Spillover violence on Turkish soil is destructive and ongoing. With over 75 Turkish war-related fatalities since mid-2012, Turkish towns face stray shots from border fights and occasional car bombs. Over the last two years, Ankara has increasingly retaliated against attacks and territorial encroachments; Turkey shot down a Syrian military helicopter and a warplane reportedly trespassing in its airspace in the past year. This year, Erdoğan has also attempted to increase border security by building walls along parts of the Syrian border and by temporarily closing border crossings when threats intensify.
The Turkish government has also been accused of supporting Sunni rebels in Syria, such as Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS cells. More generally, Ankara has been charged with promoting a pro-Sunni agenda in the region. As a result, Turkey has lost credibility as a nonsectarian arbiter in Syria’s civil war. Erdoğan’s government denies aiding groups like al-Nusra and on June 3 designated the group as a terrorist organization; however, past evidence of cross-border arms shipments and infrequent prevention of rebel border crossings raises questions.
In addition to the security challenges the prime minister faces, Turkey’s refugee situation has become more acute due to socioeconomic problems resulting from the influx of Syrians into Turkey. As of July 24, the official number of registered refugees in Turkey was 808,576, but government estimates including undocumented refugees exceed one million. Difficulties of caring for and monitoring Syrian refugees are compounded by the fact that only about 35 percent of the refugees live in Turkish government-organized camps. Moreover, the financial burden of providing housing, medical treatment and other necessities to Syrian refugees puts pressure on Turkey’s already strained economy. The Turkish government has paid for most of the above costs, having spent $3.5 billion to date, but is doing so with record levels of inflation and an economic downturn. Moreover, Erdoğan’s refugee policy has faced domestic criticism. In a poll conducted this past January, only 11 percent of Turks supported accepting unlimited Syrian refugees. While widespread empathy for Syrians remains, the influx of Syrians into Turkish cities and border towns has raised concerns of skyrocketing rents, vagrancy and employment.
Despite socioeconomic issues and domestic criticism, Erdoğan shows little inclination to revise his refugee policy. In speeches, he emphasizes the humanitarian imperative of taking in Syrians in need, and any changes he makes to border policies seem to be intended to prevent extremist attacks rather than to keep the refugee population in Turkey at a manageable level. In a recent report, however, the International Crisis Group urged Ankara to move away from its current emergency approach to the refugee crisis and to develop a comprehensive accommodation plan allowing refugees to integrate into Turkish society.
Erdoğan is also challenged by domestic political tensions. Within the ruling Justice and Development Party, the prime minister faces a minor split with President Abdullah Gül, who publicly called for a reset to Ankara’s Syria policy. In addition to this divide, public support for Erdoğan’s policy is weak. In 2013, polling found that only 28 percent of Turks supported Ankara’s involvement with Syria. The opposition Republican People’s Party has taken advantage of this domestic disillusionment to claim that Erdoğan wants to go to war with Syria and to blame Erdoğan’s military interventions for Turkey’s worsening international image. Despite their criticism, opposition parties likely pose little electoral threat to Erdoğan in his run in August’s upcoming presidential elections.
Prime Minister Erdoğan has been adopting a more pragmatic approach to his Syria policy, with reforms to border security and attempts at regional Kurdish reconciliation. It remains to be seen, however, whether the changes Erdoğan has implemented will have any qualitative difference on the political, strategic and socioeconomic situation in Turkey, especially considering the policy’s continuing issues. If Erdoğan does not continue to revise his Syria policy according to regional developments, the prime minister may struggle to regain domestic support and to mitigate the effects of the Syrian conflict on his country.
Emily Kinkaid is a research associate with the Levant Program at Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy. Kinkaid graduated from Goucher College with bachelor’s degrees in International Relations and French, and her interests include international security and spillover from intrastate conflicts.