Given that it is summer break, I finally have time to think about superhero movies. Although I have yet to see the latest Spider-Man movie in theaters, my mind keeps wandering back to Peter Parker’s Uncle Ben, who said “with great power comes great responsibility.” Since the beginning of June, I have been interning with the Baker Institute’s Science and Technology Policy Program, and I couldn’t help but compare Peter Parker’s duty to balance power and responsibility to the latest controversy over avian flu virus research.
In the past few months, two papers were finally published in the journals Science and Nature, detailing experiments in which scientists were able to manipulate the avian flu virus so that it became contagious in mammals. The papers describe how researchers changed a few genes until ferrets, the mammal model for humans, could spread the disease by sneezing and coughing. The virus, also known as H5N1, is currently not transmissible in humans, but it is highly dangerous. It is estimated that 60 percent of reported infections have resulted in death.
This new research could help us identify a more contagious virus early or even lead to important vaccines that could prevent a pandemic. Conversely, the research could also become a potential weapon of bioterrorism, much in the same way that Peter Parker’s “spidey” powers could be used for good or — if he is irresponsible — evil.
So what is the responsible thing to do in this case? Should we allow this kind of research to be published in full, thereby giving would-be terrorists access to the recipe for a potential pandemic?
In my view, the answer is yes.
First of all, imposing publication or funding restrictions on dangerous infectious disease research would create a strong disincentive for young scientists to enter the fields where new research is most needed. Whether we like it or not, publications are a key factor that can make or break a scientist’s career. One thing I have learned during my time at Rice is that today’s path to becoming a scientist is incredibly long and full of uncertainty. If I were a young scientist deciding on a field of research to pursue, I might be advised to avoid influenza research if public policies limited me from publishing crucial work on the nature of viruses. According to the World Health Organization, this research “must continue to take place so that critical scientific knowledge needed to reduce the risks posed by the H5N1 virus continues to increase.” If we restrict scientific publications in this field, we risk diverting young talent away from research that is essential for public health.
Denying publication may not even be an effective way to deter potential bioterrorists. A recent perspective from Science magazine compared the flu research controversy to cybersecurity problems, stating “security based on secrecy is inherently fragile.” In today’s world, information is not secure. It is dangerous to assume that hiding the results of these studies from the public would completely prevent terrorists from gaining access to them. Research on evolution, on manipulating genes, and on the behavior of viruses is already widely available. Potential bioterrorists could arguably use current scientific knowledge to construct novel bioweapons. I think it is also important to note that the viruses in the recently published studies were not actually lethal in ferrets. Thus, as a report from the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity put it, the research was not “immediately enabling” for bioterrorists. I would rather see the threat of bioterrorism become a powerful impetus for more vaccine research, rather than a justification for holding back science.
Technology that can be used for either societal benefit or harm, often called “dual-use” technology, has been implemented in the past when the benefits outweighed the risks. For example, satellites have completely transformed our world, even though they have the potential to be used as weapons. Given the gravity of the avian flu virus, the risks of bioterrorism are not something we can ignore, but the danger that avian flu viruses could evolve in the wild and create a global public health threat must be addressed. According to the New York Times, the influenza virus that killed around 50 million people in 1918 required only a few genetic changes to become contagious in humans. Both the 1918 virus and the avian flu virus originated in birds and are known to infect similar parts of the lungs.
In the case of flu research, modern science has given us enormous power. We now have the potential to create vaccines before viruses have a chance to evolve into something more dangerous. However, with this power comes great responsibility. In order to prepare and protect the world from future pandemics, we must encourage the free exchange of scientific knowledge.
Meredith Jackson, a rising junior at Rice University, is a summer intern for the Baker Institute Science and Technology Policy Program. She is majoring in biochemistry.