North Korea after Kim Jong Il

With the death of North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong Il, which was announced yesterday, we enter a nervous new phase in Asian diplomacy. Korea watchers have known that Kim Jong Il’s health was not well for some time. His death is something we knew was coming, but there are many possible outcomes it could produce. Thus, there are some very important potential developments that should be considered by the United States, South Korea, Japan, Russia and (not least) China.

The most important question regards succession of supreme power from Kim Jong Il to an heir or regent. Kim’s youngest son, Kim Jong Un, has been named the hereditary successor to his father, as his other brothers are viewed as marginal or irresponsible. (Some years ago, one brother was detained by Japanese authorities attempting to enter the country on a false third-country passport.) The important item to consider in this area is that we can assume that the North Koreans have been preparing for this moment, and that Kim Jong Un will be made out to be legitimate by the country’s internal propaganda organs.

Our great concern, then, is if such a succession plan breaks down and an internal struggle between factions in the North Korean ruling elite emerges. This could be enormously destabilizing. What we don’t want to see is a breakdown of relations between elements of the military and the further decline of the fortunes for the deeply impoverished North Korean population. While life for the average peasant or worker in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is dreadfully difficult now, things could get worse if the remaining state-run mechanisms for food distribution and other basic resource provisioning collapse. Then we would have a humanitarian crisis on our hands.

Such a crisis would send millions of North Koreans streaming north into Chinese Manchuria, in winter. High temperatures there are forecast to remain below the freezing mark all of this week. The Korean peninsula can be a cold, cold place in winter. So, we have the potential for a humanitarian disaster on our hands. If only Mr. Kim could have passed in June.

Worse would be some sort of militarized struggle for control of the country. Let us hope we hear no reports of violence in the DPRK between elements of the military in the next few days. North Korea’s army is a highly disciplined force, but if its commanders disagree on the future course of the country, then things could take a very ugly turn.

Additionally, we should be wary of how the DRPK’s neighbors may view this crisis as an opportunity. The current government in Seoul, led by President Lee Myung-bak, has generally taken a hard line on security issues related to the North. Why not? The DPRK likely sank the South Korean corvette Cheonan in 2010 and the two countries have traded fire across the DMZ sporadically since then. While many in South Korea would like to see a unified Korean state and nation, President Lee is likely not to force any hasty reconciliation now. For that we should be thankful. The political leaders in power in Seoul today are pragmatic realists when it comes to relations with Pyongyang. They have to be — their homes and offices are well in range of North Korean artillery massed just north of the DMZ.

For Japan and the United States, the only major concern is the development of a significant military crisis. While Seoul has put its forces on full alert, the world will be relieved if leaders in Washington and Tokyo speak in reassuring tones for now. The most important message North Koreans need to hear is that both countries want only stability in their country.

And then there is China, which has been a key supporter of the Kim Jong Il government, but perhaps an uneasy one as well. Clearly Beijing wants stability as well, but it will be interesting to see what public overtures the Chinese government will make toward both Koreas in the coming days. A China able to keep a lid on the North and manage this crisis toward broader dialogue aimed at inter-Korean rapprochement would be one that could demonstrate itself as a responsible, capable and persuasive force in Asian politics.

For the next few days, we can look forward to a lot of wait and see. Things may be very uneventful in the days leading up to the Supreme Leader’s funeral on Dec. 29. But, we’re talking about the North Koreans, so we must be prepared to expect the bizarre and the completely unexpected.

Christopher Bronk is the Baker Institute fellow in information technology policy. He previously served as a career diplomat with the United States Department of State on assignments both overseas and in Washington, D.C.