A recent report by the Associated Press described some of the specialized counter-terrorist tactics of the New York City Police Department (NYPD) as it continues to work to keep New Yorkers safe from another 9/11-type attack. Specifically, the article reported that NYPD was conducting domestic intelligence operations in predominantly Muslim communities modeled after CIA overseas collection operations.
The article describes how, with the assistance of David Cohen, former CIA deputy director of operations (clandestine ops), the NYPD utilizes their very diverse workforce with appropriate language skills to create a cadre of undercover (UC) officers to infiltrate Muslim neighborhoods and places where Muslims might congregate such as cafes and bookstores. These UC officers are to “rake the coals looking for hot spots” and they are known as “rakers.” The rakers are tasked with monitoring the comings and goings of local individuals and reporting back to their colleague handlers on anything untoward going on in the community.
Like any good intelligence operation, NYPD eventually decided it needed HUMINT (human- sourced intelligence) in order to gather on-the-ground information directly from individuals within locations that merited investigation based on the rakers’ reports. Again, CIA HUMINT recruitment operations served as the model for NYPD officers who spot and recruit human sources or confidential informants. Information is funneled back to NYPD’s Counterterrorist Operations Center where it is analyzed for trends in activity. Information may be collected on individuals who might be new to the area, or who may in contact with other individuals who espouse extremist Islamic views.
That this intelligence operation is going on in New York City (NYC) should surprise no one, especially in light of 9/11 and the continued al-Qaeda obsession with additional attacks on the city. However, the NYPD is operating in a very gray area with regard to conducting domestic intelligence collection operations. For example, NYPD believes that threats to NYC are to be pursued anywhere on the planet. This includes setting up intelligence operations in neighboring New Jersey or Massachusetts. Moreover, NYPD already has liaison officers working with local, national and international law enforcement agencies in London, Paris, Madrid, Lyon (France), Tel Aviv, Amman, Abu Dhabi, Singapore, Toronto, Montreal and Santo Domingo.
Second, U.S. law prohibits the CIA from conducting intelligence activities against U.S. citizens overseas and within the continental United States. The fact that CIA intelligence officers have been assisting NYPD in setting up and training NYPD in intelligence operations blurs the line separating law enforcement and intelligence. Moreover, the FBI has to stand by and watch this scenario develop because federal law prevents the FBI from counterterrorism activities such as sending in an informant into local mosques to listen to possible radical sermons. Finally, there may be a legal question of ethnic profiling of Muslims and places where Muslims congregate.
Some critics may hold issue with the NYPD’s tactics. However, the aggressive and preemptive attitude towards terrorism exhibited by the NYPD is laudable and the intelligence collection program could be used as a model for and adapted by other large police departments to fit their individual situations. Unfortunately, other large police departments such as Los Angeles have considered, but not established such a program citing civil liberty concerns. Also, the Big Brother argument and ethnic profiling always come into play. These concerns should not be discounted, but in the name of keeping the public safe from attack, the concerns should not prohibit a preemptive counterterrorist attitude.
Is it necessarily profiling an ethnic group when the vast majority of terrorist attacks have come from radical individuals within or influenced by that group? Intelligence is similarly collected against narcoterrorists overseas or street gangs domestically. While civil liberties and the Fourth Amendment should be evaluated for all domestic surveillance activities, shouldn’t police be able to seek out and collect information on individuals who would seek to do harm to their fellow countrymen?
Simply put, are we going to revert to a reactive mode of policing potential terrorists in the name of not offending a particular group? That attitude gave us 9/11. Reaching out to and asking for local assistance under these circumstances is one way to reassure the public. Furthermore, safeguards such as local committees patterned after Congressional oversight committees can be established to insure compliance with privacy laws. But, unless aggressive tactics such as those practiced by NYPD are pursued by others, there very well could be another catastrophic attack on the U.S. — and not necessarily in New York City.
Steve Young, Ph.D., is a retired CIA counterterrorism officer with tours in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq. He is presently the coordinator for the Masters in Security Studies at Sam Houston State University in Huntsville, Texas. He is blogging at the invitation of Baker Institute information technology fellow Chris Bronk, Ph.D.