By Joe Barnes
Bonner Means Baker Fellow
When it comes to Afghanistan, Joe Biden is as good as his word. During the presidential campaign, Biden said he would withdraw U.S. troops. Less than three months into his administration, Biden announced a military exit from Afghanistan by September 11. Now, in July, the withdrawal — despite grumbling within the security establishment and some congressional opposition — is in full swing. The U.S. is not only leaving Afghanistan but given the looming deadline, we are rushing to do so. Our NATO allies with troops in Afghanistan are following suit.
The U.S. withdrawal is occurring against a backdrop of substantial gains by the Taliban, the rebel force opposing the Afghan government. While Afghan government–Taliban talks continue in Qatar, the latter is not biding its time on the battlefield. The government in Kabul may not be on the verge of collapse. But the prospects for its long- or even medium-term survival, despite Biden’s pledge of continued military and civilian assistance, are dubious. Even with a substantial US. .military presence — which reached over 100,000 during President Obama’s surge of 2009-2011 — the Afghan government has been incapable of striking a decisive blow against the Taliban. In recent years, the government has barely been holding its own. It is hard to imagine the ongoing withdrawal as doing anything but accelerate the deterioration of the Afghan government’s strategic position.
Biden has declared that we will continue to conduct long-distance strikes in Afghanistan against terrorist groups that target U.S. interests. The U.S. will also keep a couple hundred troops to protect the embassy in Kabul and the city’s airport. But, on balance, Biden’s decision to withdraw almost all troops appears ironclad. His statement of July 8 makes this clear.
There has been pushback against the withdrawal. This is hardly surprising: substantial portions of our defense and foreign policy establishment, both in and outside of government, have been personally involved in our failed strategy in Afghanistan. A number of congressional Republicans have also criticized Biden’s move. Some of this may be routine partisan opposition. But we should recall that there was some congressional Republican opposition to Trump’s 2020 withdrawal plan, too.
Opponents of the withdrawal have good points. A U.S. exit does in fact make a Taliban victory more likely. This will have serious consequences in terms of human rights, particularly the status of women and girls. A Taliban victory will also likely eliminate what remains of an admittedly very imperfect Afghan democracy. In addition, there is a risk that the Taliban — which hosted Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan prior to the 911 attacks — will take an accommodating approach to terrorist groups. Yet these critiques fail to answer fundamental questions. If we don’t withdraw now, when do we? Under what plausible circumstances can we end our presence? In the absence of a viable alternative that does not involve an open-ended commitment in Afghanistan, Biden’s plan to withdraw makes sense — even if it does entail potential real costs and real risks.
For now, Biden can depend on public support for the withdrawal. Many Americans have grown disenchanted with what have been called U.S. “forever wars” in the Middle East. Our involvement in Afghanistan, which the U.S. embarked upon in the immediate aftermath of the 911 attacks, is the longest of those wars. It is now approaching 20 years in duration. Over 2,300 U.S. service people have died there. The estimated costs to our intervention run to $1 trillion or more.
In some ways, Biden faces the same predicament that Richard Nixon did with Vietnam. The comparison is imperfect, as all historical analogies are. Vietnam was a far more costly war for the United States in terms of American lives. Over 50,000 U.S. service men and women died there. And Biden faces almost none of the mass opposition to U.S. involvement that Nixon confronted in the early 1970s. But, like Biden, Nixon confronted the unenviable task of extricating the United States from a long-term military commitment. It hit too close to home for comfort.
Perhaps there will be a sustainable power-sharing agreement between the Afghan government and the Taliban. Perhaps the Afghan military will prove more resilient in the field than many expect. But these are big “ifs.” And to judge from Biden’s policies and pronouncements to date, his administration is willing to accept the defeat of the Afghan government if that is a cost of ending our nearly 20-year-old intervention.