President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey
Turkey held key parliamentary and presidential elections last Sunday following sweeping constitutional reforms that were adopted in 2017. The election resulted in a multiparty presidential configuration in which the president’s party does not have a majority in the parliament.
In the presidential election, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan exceeded expectations and won outright in the first round with 52.5% of the vote. Muharrem Ince of the main opposition party CHP failed to translate pre-election enthusiasm for the opposition into electoral gains (30.7%). Despite a rejuvenated grassroots mobilization, voter support for Ince and CHP fell below 2014 election levels.
In the parliamentary elections, the ruling AKP won 42.5% of the vote and the plurality of seats, but fell a few seats short of an outright majority. However, AKP’s partner, the Nationalist Action Party (MHP), offered the AKP and Erdogan a much-needed boost with 11.1% of votes and 50 seats, nearly doubling the pre-election predictions for the party’s performance. The CHP won 22.7% of the votes and just short of a quarter of the parliamentary seats. The Kurdish HDP and Meral Aksener’s breakaway centrist-nationalist IYI Party both won around 11% and 67 and 50 seats, respectively.
What do the election results suggest? There are a number of key takeaways.
Despite great societal discontent with Erdogan and his AKP, especially among the country’s secular citizens, Erdogan nevertheless has achieved great popularity and remains the country’s most important political figure.
The loss to Erdogan has left the opposition, particularly the CHP, in a state of disbelief. The party successfully fielded a presidential candidate who possessed the personal charm and charisma many before him lacked, energized the opposition, and focused on bread-and-butter issues important to the electorate. Millions showed up for his rallies. Yet, at the end of the day, the opposition fell short of even forcing Erdogan into a second round.
Prior to the election, many in the opposition and beyond expressed concerns about the risk of electoral fraud. This perception mobilized opposition parties and civil society organizations to implement measures to protect the ballot box and the integrity of results. If election day has taught a lesson, it is about the disunity of the opposition, which is united merely in their opposition to Erdogan. The opposition lacked the organization, technical capacity, and coordination to convince large swaths of the electorate of its capabilities.
High levels of organizational discipline and cross-party coordination are sine qua non for challenging the well-oiled electoral machine that has proved so successful for Erdogan since 2002.
What comes next?
The election certainly brings more of the same for Turks — Erdogan will continue ruling the country. At the same time, however, for the first time in 16 years, the opposition has an opportunity to break the AKP’s parliamentary dominance. The AKP can hold onto control of the parliament only through the party’s alliance with the nationalist MHP.
While this is not the ideal outcome for the opposition, it marks a key change from years past. The MHP will be the kingmaker. The party is well positioned to deny legislative support to the AKP on occasion and can possibly negotiate important concessions on the Syrian refugee and Kurdish issues. However, an effective negotiating strategy for the MHP requires a credible threat; the party’s ability to align with the opposition and deprive the AKP of its majority will allow the MHP exert a disproportionate influence in the legislative process.
If the opposition can capitalize on this opportunity, there may be occasions where the opposition can score some policy victories and contain AKP’s legislative agenda. This is no small feat for an opposition that remained on the outside looking in for the past 16 years.
The loss of an outright parliamentary majority by the AKP creates another intriguing prospect for opposition parties: collaboration by the opposition. While the legacy of the 1970s and the intensity of ethnic identity politics prevented parties like the CHP, MHP and HDP to work together and take stock of previous opportunities to end AKP’s parliamentary control (the aftermath of June 2015 elections is a case in point) the new political system and current parliamentary make-up allow parties to engage in trust-building without long-term commitments.
If there is genuine interest in gaining control of the legislative agenda and limiting the AKP’s 16-year-old control of the parliament, parties can collaborate on various issues to gradually wrestle the legislative agenda away from the AKP and hope to gain an electoral advantage in future elections.
The absence of a parliamentary majority sets up an interesting configuration: The executive and the legislative branches are not controlled by the same political party. While, in principle, this is likely to produce varying parliamentary configurations to pass legislation, there exists a significant risk of legislative gridlock. Historically, multiparty presidential systems are most vulnerable to legislative gridlock and eventual extra-democratic intervention.
In the Turkish context, such gridlock could allow a greater opportunity for Erdogan to assert his executive authority. The wide scope of executive power, judicial appointments, and control over the government budget – courtesy of the new presidential system – could inspire Erdogan to act unilaterally, ignoring the parliament or setting up frequent conflicts with the parliament. In a parliamentary system, such conflicts can be contained by the requirement to maintain parliamentary support at all times; the new presidential system waives such a requirement, as the president and the cabinet do not need parliamentary support to function.
However, the opposition parties can take the initiative in the legislative process and limit unilateral actions by Erdogan if they can manage to set aside their differences and act in unison. This is easier said than done. It first requires collaboration on procedural issues and minor policy initiatives in order to build trust among parties, and is followed by action on more substantive policy topics.
Turkey enters a new phase in which the opposition parties simultaneously have an opportunity to influence policymaking and carry a disproportionate burden to prevent a breakdown of the political system. For the opposition to be successful, these parties will need to be more focused, proactive, and collaborative.
A.Kadir Yildirim is a fellow for the Middle East at the Baker Institute. His main research interests include politics and religion, political Islam, the politics of the Middle East and Turkish politics.