Secretary of State Mike Pompeo
Image credit: Michael Reynolds/EPA
In a speech on May 21, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo laid out what was billed as the Trump administration’s new approach to Iran. His remarks, titled “After the Deal: A New Iran Strategy,” followed President Donald Trump’s May 8 announcement that the United States was withdrawing from the Iran nuclear agreement.
In his speech, Pompeo took a very hard line. He harshly attacked both the nuclear deal — technically, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) — and the Iranian government for what he called its “malign influence in the region.” He promised a campaign of economic sanctions and other pressure to ensure that “Iran will never again have carte blanche to dominate the Middle East.”
At the heart of Pompeo’s speech were a series of demands:
“First, Iran must declare to the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] a full account of the prior military dimensions of its nuclear program, and permanently and verifiably abandon such work in perpetuity.
“Second, Iran must stop enrichment and never pursue plutonium reprocessing. This includes closing its heavy water reactor.
“Third, Iran must also provide the IAEA with unqualified access to all sites throughout the entire country.
“Iran must end its proliferation of ballistic missiles and halt further launching or development of nuclear-capable missile systems.
“Iran must release all U.S. citizens, as well as citizens of our partners and allies, each of them detained on spurious charges.
“Iran must end support to Middle East terrorist groups, including Lebanese Hezbollah, Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.
“Iran must respect the sovereignty of the Iraqi government and permit the disarming, demobilization, and reintegration of Shia militias.
“Iran must also end its military support for the Houthi militia and work toward a peaceful political settlement in Yemen.
“Iran must withdraw all forces under Iranian command throughout the entirety of Syria.
“Iran, too, must end support for the Taliban and other terrorists in Afghanistan and the region, and cease harboring senior al-Qaida leaders.
“Iran, too, must end the IRG Quds Force’s support for terrorists and militant partners around the world.
“And too, Iran must end its threatening behavior against its neighbors — many of whom are U.S. allies. This certainly includes its threats to destroy Israel, and its firing of missiles into Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. It also includes threats to international shipping and destructive cyberattacks.”
Only three of the demands refer to Iran’s nuclear program. One refers to the country’s ballistic missile program. Most of the rest address a wide range of Iranian activities in the Persian Gulf and Afghanistan. The comprehensive nature of the demands represents a forthright repudiation of the Obama administration’s compartmentalized approach to Iran, which separated negotiation of the JCPOA from broader concerns about Iran’s international behavior.
In return for Iranian agreement to these demands, Pompeo declared that the United States would “re-establish full diplomatic and commercial relationships” with Iran and support the “reintegration of the Iranian economy into the international economic system.”
The Iranian government promptly rejected Pompeo’s demands. This was no surprise. To meet Pompeo’s requirements, Iran would not only be forced to accept new restrictions on its nuclear and ballistic missile programs; it would be compelled to reverse its long-term foreign policy in the Persian Gulf, abandoning traditional allies and surrendering influence in nearby countries. There is a vanishingly small chance that the current Iranian government — even under substantial economic pressure — would ever yield to Pompeo’s entire list of demands.
This is why some observers believe that the demands represent the foundation of a policy of regime change. According to this analysis, the whole point of issuing the 12 demands is that Iran will not accept them; the Trump administration’s ultimate goal is to use economic and other pressure to topple the Iranian regime itself. Indeed, Pompeo spent a substantial portion of his speech decrying the Iranian government’s oppression of its own citizens. Whether increased economic hardship in Iran would, in fact, lead to a popular uprising against the Iranian government is a very open question; such hardship might, at least in the short- to medium-term, actually strengthen the hands of Iranian leaders who could rally nationalist sentiment in opposition to the dictates of a foreign power. Increased support for the Iranian political opposition — a likely element of a regime change strategy — could prove similarly counterproductive. U.S. support would surely be used to brand opponents to the current Iranian regime as traitors.
There is the possibility, of course, that the list is merely an opening, maximal position subject to negotiation. But it is difficult to imagine the Iranian government agreeing to comprehensive talks. Moreover, exerting sufficient pressure to bring Iran to the table would require high levels of international cooperation. The United States position will find some support, particularly in Israel and Saudi Arabia, which lead a de facto anti-Iranian coalition. But the broader international community, whatever its concerns about Iranian behavior, will be wary about another round of intensified sanctions on Iran. The EU is already pushing back on potential U.S. action against European firms doing business in Iran. U.S. efforts to reduce Iranian oil exports will require the cooperation of countries like China and India. This may be difficult to obtain.
Then there is the question of what the United States will do to address Iran’s “malign” behavior in the region. What, exactly, does the Trump administration plan to do about Iran’s decades-long support for Hezbollah in Lebanon? How does it intend to limit Iran’s military presence in Syria or reduce Iran’s influence in Iraq? How far is the U.S. prepared to go in terms of military action? Who will be our partners if the U.S. opts for it?
Pompeo’s speech was short on practical details. But details are everything when it comes to an effective strategy. Goals are easy. All they take is the back of an envelope and a pencil. The hard work of foreign policy consists of choosing means — diplomatic initiatives, economic sanctions, military pressure — that advance overarching objectives. Without such means and the resources to sustain them, Pompeo’s demands are essentially a wish list. At best, the secretary of state’s speech represents half a strategy.
Joe Barnes is the Bonner Means Baker Fellow at the Baker Institute. From 1979 to 1993, he was a career diplomat with the U.S. State Department, serving in Europe, Africa, the Middle East and South Asia.