Well, the Iranian nuclear talks have been extended. Both sides in the negotiations — Iran and the P-5 plus 1 (The United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, China and Germany) — have agreed to delay the deadline to July 1, 2015. Talks are expected to resume next month.
This extension is the second since the parties to the talks struck an interim agreement — formally a Joint Plan of Action — in November 2013. Under the agreement, Iran agreed to a limited rollback in its nuclear program in return for modest sanctions relief.
The current extension should come as no surprise to anyone paying attention to news reports during recent days. By all accounts, negotiations were frenzied as the two sides struggled to come to an agreement before the November 24 deadline. The clear implication: a deal was at the very least in sight — if by no means certain. Given a) the sense of progress in the talks and b) the existence of outstanding issues, many high technical in nature, yet to be revolved, an extension reflects simple common sense.
But fear has also surely driven the decision to extend negotiations. Given their huge public investment in the talks, an outright failure would be a severe blow to both the Obama administration and to moderates in the Iranian government. Both have faced harsh criticism from hardliners in their own countries for allegedly too weak a stance in the talks. In addition, key U.S. allies in the Middle East — notably Israel and Saudi Arabia — have long been skeptical, to say the least, about the Obama administration’s approach to the negotiations with Iran. Both would prefer a tougher posture toward Iran’s nuclear program, including a possible U.S. military strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities.
Moreover, a breakdown in negotiations would have occurred at a very delicate moment in U.S. policy in the Persian Gulf, as Washington and Tehran find themselves informal and uneasy partners in the struggle against ISIS. A collapse in the talks would have led to the end of the modest sanctions relief granted Tehran under last year’s interim agreement, further poisoning the already poor relationship between the United States and Iran. Moreover, the U.S. Congress — particularly when Republicans assume control of the U.S. Senate early next year — would likely seize the opportunity to pass even more punitive sanctions against Iran. Not least, a failure would increase the drumbeat, here in the United States and in the Persian Gulf, for Washington to launch airstrikes against Iran. President Obama might well have vetoed another round of sanctions; he almost certainly would have avoided an attack on Iran. But a failure of the talks would surely have weakened his hand at home and abroad.
I’ve written elsewhere that a reasonable, even if imperfect, deal with Iran is in the U.S. interest. An agreement would, at the very least, substantially increase the time necessary for Tehran to “go nuclear” should it choose to do so in the future. In the longer term an accord might — let me repeat: might — lay the groundwork for an eventual normalization of Washington’s relations with Tehran.
The Middle East is already a turbulent, violent place. Extending the nuclear talks will make it a little less complicated and a little less deadly — at least for seven months.
Joe Barnes is the Baker Institute’s Bonner Means Baker Fellow. From 1979 to 1993, he was a career diplomat with the U.S. Department of State, serving in Europe, Africa, the Middle East and South Asia.