The images of masked militants from ISIS streaming into Iraq have led to panic and assertions that the end of Iraq is imminent. While ISIS (an acronym for the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, which is also known as ISIL or IS) should not be taken lightly, the fears that a permanent jihadist state will emerge in Iraq are exaggerated. The root of Iraq’s present crisis is not purely extremism; it is largely Sunni political grievances and disenfranchisement. The resolution of the present crisis will depend on whether these grievances can be addressed. Given Iraq’s recent struggles to overcome sectarianism, optimism would normally be out of place. However, in this case, there are some reasons to be hopeful. Signs point toward Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki being replaced with a less polarizing figure who can conclude a deal with the Sunni community in Iraq. If a political compromise can be reached, ISIS’s state will not survive long.
The ISIS invasion is a product of political dysfunction. This group succeeded by working alongside a wide range of local groups. ISIS also depends on support from the local population as a whole. In the words of Charles Lister of The Brookings Institution, “[ISIS] is still totally reliant on an interdependent relationship with what remains a tacitly sympathetic and facilitating Sunni population.” These groups and the public have not cooperated with ISIS because they share its extremist ideology. Rather, top Sunni political and religious leaders agree that the crisis should be seen in part as a Sunni uprising against the central government and the abusive policies that it has carried out. Sunni marginalization under Maliki deteriorated to the point of the Iraqi security forces indiscriminately detaining and torturing young Sunnis, and using lethal force to suppress peaceful Sunni political demonstrations. It is no surprise that Sunni leaders now demand an end to such practices and for Maliki to be replaced as prime minister. Moderate Sunni political leaders have offered to turn against ISIS if these political grievances can be addressed. Iraq’s future as a single state is largely contingent on whether these political issues can be resolved.
Since Maliki’s ouster is a precondition for Sunnis to consider reconciliation, the upcoming vote by the Iraqi Parliament on the next prime minister is crucial. Despite being under fire, Maliki remains a serious contender and he hopes to secure a third term. He is presently the nominee of the State of Law coalition (SoL). Electing a prime minister without SoL support would be hard given that this coalition controls the most parliamentary seats. Doing so would require other members of the National Alliance, a grouping of the major Shiite parties, to abandon the alliance with the SoL coalition and partner with Sunni and Kurdish parties. Such a move is one that Tehran would not permit as it would decrease their influence in Baghdad.
In spite of these factors working to his advantage, Maliki is unlikely to remain as prime minister as his prospects of remaining the SoL’s candidate are quite low. Sunnis, Kurds and even other Shiite political leaders have all united in calling for his ouster, with the Shiite religious leadership and the United States also withdrawing their support. The Iranian government that previously favored him is now reportedly starting to “lean away from Maliki.” Even some SoL leaders have already expressed a desire to choose a new candidate, with the next biggest Shiite bloc, al-Ahrar, throwing support behind this prospect by saying they would back any other SoL nominee. This all points to the SoL nominating a new candidate. In this case, Maliki would likely try to influence the selection of his successor so that he could retain influence and also avoid potential prosecution. Maliki is likely to support his chief of staff, Tariq Najm Abdullah, who has broad political support within the SoL.
Despite his close ties to Maliki, Abdullah differs in that he has a reputation as a consensus builder, and his current absence of a public persona gives him the opportunity to portray himself as unifying figure. Abdullah will face immediate pressure to end the crisis. The failure of the Iraqi military to take back Tikrit after weeks of focused effort illustrates the protracted slog a military campaign without Sunni support would entail. It would be in the interest of moderate Sunni militants and tribal leaders to come to the table in this scenario, given that much of their cooperation with ISIS was done in hopes of achieving this. They will also be under pressure to reach a deal, given that ISIS will continue to consolidate power at the expense of their political position within the Sunni community.
The demands of Sunni leaders will include general amnesty for any Sunnis involved in the uprising, an end to de-Baathification laws being used to target Sunnis, a greater degree of decentralized governance, and an end to abusive practices by the Iraqi Security Forces, with greater Sunni inclusion within its ranks. None of these should be deal breakers for the Shiite political leadership, and the only major disputes will likely be over whether decentralization extends to the point of creating a separate Sunni fighting force or even autonomous federal regions. The one caveat to all this is that Sunnis will be wary of Shiite domination beginning again once ISIS is kicked out, as happened after the 2006 Awakening movement. As long as an arrangement can be worked out in which Sunni political demands will be met, a political compromise should be achievable. Such a political solution would significantly weaken ISIS’s support in the territory it controls and would make it difficult then for ISIS to continue to have a state in northern Iraq.
Anything, though, could happen in a situation this dynamic. Iran could firmly decide on a candidate outside the SoL and force the SoL to accept him, or Abdullah could win but throw aside his diplomatic skills and continue Maliki’s sectarian policies. Nonetheless, signs in Iraq are pointing toward political reconciliation. It will only be a first step toward closing the great Sunni-Shiite political rift in Iraq. Removing ISIS will not be trivial and security issues will persist in Iraq for a long time. But the signs do point toward reconciliation becoming more likely, while the prospects of a permanent Iraqi Islamic State are becoming increasingly less so.