A “yes” vote on Scotland’s referendum on independence, set to take place in September, would dissolve the formal political union between Scotland and England that has existed since 1707. (The two countries have shared a common monarch since 1603.)
In June, President Obama, in guarded but clear language, voiced U.S. opposition to Scottish independence. Speaking of the referendum, he declared that Washington had an interest in a “strong, robust, united and effective partner.”
The referendum is, of course, momentous for the people of Scotland, who would find themselves in uncharted economic, political and strategic waters. Indeed, a “yes” vote would not lead to immediate independence but, instead, a period of protracted negotiation between Edinburgh and London on the precise terms of separation. The issues — the allocation of national debt, the role of the British pound in an independent Scotland, the division of offshore oil revenues, and the disposition of U.K. military bases — are complex and fraught.
The referendum is also important for the United Kingdom as a whole. If Scotland gains independence, the United Kingdom would lose perhaps eight percent of its population and GDP in one fell swoop. Moreover, there are domestic political ramifications. Scotland has long been a Labour Party stronghold. Conservatives would likely fare much better in national elections if Scotland were no longer represented in London. Indeed, they would have won an outright majority of seats in 2010 (and theoretically dispensed with their Liberal Democrat coalition partners) if Scotland had no seats in parliament. Nonetheless, the Conservative Party — like its coalition partner, the Liberal Democrats, and the opposition Labour Party — is urging Scots to vote “no” on independence.
Finally, the referendum has broader European ramifications. A “yes” vote might well encourage other separatist movements, notably among Catalans in Spain. In fact, an independent Scotland would find it difficult to join the EU in the face of Madrid’s opposition; the Spanish government is afraid of setting a precedent that it will live to regret.
The stakes for the United States are more modest. As Obama stressed in his comments, we acknowledge the legality of the referendum, which will be held under an agreement negotiated between the ruling Scottish National Party in Edinburgh and the Conservative-Liberal Democrat government in London. On balance, however, Obama is right to oppose independence. The United Kingdom has long been a staunch ally of the United States. Scottish independence would make London a marginally weaker partner. Scottish nationalist leaders have signaled an interest in joining NATO. But an independent Scotland — given the size of its modest population, which lies between that of Denmark and Norway — would bring few strengths to the alliance. In addition, strong anti-nuclear sentiment among nationalists would call into doubt the future of the U.K.’s Trident submarine base in Scotland and the U.K.’s role in NATO’s nuclear deterrence. (It is important, however, not to exaggerate that role. The United Kingdom possesses 160 active nuclear warheads; the United States’ stockpile exceeds 1,900. Like France’s similarly modest nuclear arsenal, the U.K.’s is as much an expression of national pride as it is a deterrent.)
All of this may well be moot. Polling shows that independence is likely to be defeated, though the margin of victory for “no” ranges from substantial to narrow, depending on the survey. A surprise “yes” vote may not be of huge geopolitical import from Washington’s perspective. But it would not be good news.
Joe Barnes is the Baker Institute’s Bonner Means Baker Fellow. From 1979 to 1993, he was a career diplomat with the U.S. Department of State, serving in Europe, Africa, the Middle East and South Asia.