This week, Norwegian oil and gas company Statoil announced that its employees would begin returning to Algeria to resume activities related to its gas production in the country. Less than a year ago, members of the Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) organization thrust Statoil’s operations onto the front page with a significant terrorist attack against its In Amenas gas production facility. The attack, which played out in a hostage crisis on Jan. 16-19, 2013, led to the deaths of 39 expatriate workers.
Much has transpired in North Africa since the In Amenas attack, not least the French-led military intervention in Mali, which was ongoing when the AQIM confederates attacked In Amenas. In Amenas was Statoil’s first foray into gas production outside of Norway, and following the attack the company commissioned an inquiry on its operations in Algeria and on the attack itself. Released in September 2013, Statoil’s In Amenas report is a highly detailed and straightforward account of what took place at the gas facility deep inside the Sahara, not far from Algeria’s border with Libya.
The report contains important lessons learned from this tragic event and its significant geopolitical consequences. Algeria is the fourth largest supplier of gas to the European Union after Russia, Norway and the Netherlands. But exports have gradually declined since 2005, beset by delays in new production projects and infrastructure issues. Following the decade-long civil war (1991-2002), the country desperately needs new investment to tap its gas supplies. Statoil is one of many foreign firms in Algeria acting to reverse the country’s export decline.
What is unusual about the In Amenas report is its transparency. A former head of Norway’s intelligence service chaired the inquiry. John Hamre, former U.S. deputy secretary of defense, and John McLaughlin, a former acting director of the CIA, served as outside advisors to the project. Rarely has there been an after the fact review of a terror attack as concise and accessible as the Statoil report.
It is important to note that the In Amenas gas production facility, which opened in 2006, is a joint venture between Statoil, BP and Sonatrach (the Algerian national energy company), and the first operation of its kind where Statoil took the lead role in the partnership. As with any terror attack, questions have arisen with regard to how well prepared Statoil was — at its headquarters in Stavanger, in its Algiers offices and at In Amenas itself.
Press coverage of the report labeled the company and its partners too reliant on the Algerian military and chronically weak in security. In addition, the report accepts that Statoil’s Algerian operations lacked imagination in their counter-terror preparations, with emphasis on the company offices in Algiers, a frequent venue for terror attacks. The report identified above-ground intelligence in Algeria as the company’s fundamental weakness, but as indicated by other terror events in the Maghreb — including the attack on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi on Sept. 11, 2012 — the difficult task of operating in developing areas of Islamic militancy and terrorism can overwhelm the national capacity of a country already spending more than $50 billion on intelligence collection, analysis and other activities.
Regardless of security failures, the fact that Mokhtar Belmokhtar, leader of the AQIM group that launched the In Amenas attack (although not the commander of the attack), could pull together 40 fighters able to compromise multiple facilities in less than 15 minutes is impressive. Algerian perimeter security, provided by police, was quickly and easily swept aside. When the Algerian response finally came, after the AQIM terrorists had taken numerous hostages, it was blunt and imprecise. The Algerian response was nothing like the counter-terror operations undertaken at the Japanese Embassy in Peru in 1997 or the Iranian Embassy in London in 1979. When bullets flew at In Amenas, it appears they flew rather indiscriminately.
And on that final point, the Statoil report provides interesting information about the path of one particular bullet: “At 05:49, a bullet hit a high voltage transformer in the living area, causing an earth fault and short circuit.” Following the stray round’s impact, power shut down across the complex, and an automated shutdown commenced. Gas locked in the system by compressors was gradually released and flared.
The New York Times asserted in the aftermath of the attack that “it seems clear that the siege was about more than disabling the plant, and that holding hostages for ransom was not part of the plan. Instead, the militants sought to orchestrate a spectacular fireball that could have killed everyone in the vicinity.” While the AQIM operatives apparently attempted to coerce a restart of the facility to produce an explosion, the stray round from the opening minutes of the attack rendered such efforts pointless.
In Amenas presents a new set of lessons learned regarding a terror attack against an energy facility. Previously, another potentially catastrophic terror event occurred at Saudi Aramco’s processing centers at Abqaiq. For those concerned with the above-ground risks to oil and gas production, both should stand as instructive cases on vulnerability to terror attacks.
Christopher Bronk is the Baker Institute fellow in information technology policy and director of the Program on Energy and Cybersecurity at the institute’s Center for Energy Studies. He previously served as a career diplomat with the U.S. Department of State on assignments in Mexico, overseas and Washington, D.C. Follow him on Twitter at @techpologist.