By all counts, Saudi Arabia is not amused by U.S. policy toward Syria and Iran. In a public display of pique, Riyadh refused a seat on the UN Security Council and has, to judge from press reports, made its displeasure plain to anyone who will listen.
Should we be surprised by the rift?
Not in the least.
States — even friendly states — have divergent interests. In the case of Syria, Saudi Arabia would clearly like to see the United States more deeply involved in the military overthrow of the Assad regime; in the case of Iran, Riyadh would just as clearly prefer Washington to take an even more adversarial stance toward Tehran, up to and including a U.S. air strike against Iran. Saudi Arabia’s object is to enlist U.S. support in what is, in many ways, an emerging Sunni-Shiite struggle for mastery in the Levant and Persian Gulf.
The United States should take the concerns of allies into account when pursuing policies that affect them. We should, as a matter of course, keep them informed of our plans. And we should even be prepared, when the costs are low, to defer to their wishes. But in the case of Syria and Iran, those costs are potentially high. If the history of the U.S. in the Middle East since 2001 has taught us one thing, it is surely the perils associated with military intervention. The United States simply cannot allow the concerns of allies — even long-standing ones, like the Saudis — to stampede us into conflict.
Perhaps Washington should take a more direct role in the Syrian civil war. Perhaps we should assume an even more confrontational stance towards Iran. I happen to believe that both would be foolish; others, needless to say, disagree. But if the United States is to embark on such high-risk policies, we must do so based upon a sober calculation of our interests.
The rift between Riyadh and Washington illustrates an important truth about international relations: alliances are means, not ends in themselves. Countries enter into them to advance their own interests. Those interests, it should be stressed, can be long-term. Our alliances with Western Europe and Japan — grounded in an appreciation of the benefits of regional stability and economic integration — are salient cases in point. Enlightened self-interest is an admirable thing. But it is still self-interest.
Will the U.S.-Saudi alliance survive the current contretemps? Yes. Even when it comes to policy toward Syria and Iran there is still substantial, if not full, agreement between the two countries. Both Washington and Riyadh want a transition to a post-Assad Syria; both want Iran stopped short of becoming a nuclear power. More generally, the United States and Saudi Arabia share a long-term interest in the unimpeded flow of Persian Gulf oil to international markets. Despite increases in oil production elsewhere, notably the United States, Riyadh remains central to those markets; only Washington has the military capacity to ensure the security of sea-lanes. To put it bluntly: Riyadh has the oil and we have the guns. This reality has driven the U.S.-Saudi alliance for decades. It will continue to do so even as the relationship evolves.
Joe Barnes is the Baker Institute’s Bonner Means Baker Fellow. From 1979 to 1993, he was a career diplomat with the U.S. Department of State, serving in Europe, Africa, the Middle East and South Asia.