In light of the radical changes in the Middle East and North Africa following the Arab Spring, civil unrest has become an issue of utmost concern for policymakers, analysts and academics. Nowhere can the implications of ignored or improperly addressed public discontent be seen more clearly than in Syria’s brutal and potentially regionally destabilizing civil war. Widespread protests are also disrupting — and even overturning — the status quo in Brazil, Turkey and Egypt. In the sixth of a seven-part Baker Institute Viewpoints series, we evaluate the impact that this new wave of civil unrest will have on international politics. In the coming days, institute experts will address the effects on U.S. foreign policy, unexpectedly stable regimes, analytical tools for understanding civil unrest and political philosophical conceptions of “just” societies.
Read other posts in this series:
- Turkey, Brazil and Egypt: The stakes for the United States by Joe Barnes, Bonner Means Baker Fellow
- Egypt and the Gulf: The illusion of stability? by Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, fellow for Kuwait
- Chaos in the streets? Blame cyberspace! by Chris Bronk, fellow in information technology policy
- What civil unrest in Brazil portends for the international system by Nathan Jones, postdoctoral fellow in drug policy
- Civil unrest: Is Mexico next? by Tony Payan, fellow in Mexico studies
- Egypt after the coup: Only the beginning of the beginning by Albert B. Wolf, doctoral candidate at the University of California, Irvine
The recent wave of civil unrest in Turkey started when a small group of environmentalists gathered in Gezi Park to protest urbanization plans to replace trees with a shopping mall in Istanbul’s historic Taksim Square. The protesters were met by police water cannons, tear gas and even fire. The next day, after news of the police brutality spread, thousands of Turks rushed to Taksim in protest, only to face more water cannons, tear gas and, this time, handcuffs. The brutish response catalyzed a wave of protests that spread to more than 50 cities across the country.
These protests, however, were about much more than trees.
The demonstrations across Turkey symbolized the greatest challenge yet to the increasingly autocratic rule of the three-term Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. And while things have mostly quieted down and Erdogan remains in power, the wave of protests had a ripple effect that may change the power calculus in Turkey.
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Despite its proximity in time and location, the protests in Turkey were not just a late continuation of the Arab Spring. Unlike her neighbors that suffered staggering unemployment under the decades-long rule of dictators pre-Arab Spring, Turkey’s economy thrives under a prime minister who, by all international accounts, freely and fairly won his last three elections — most recently by a landslide. In fact, many domestic and foreign scholars credit Erdogan for bringing Turkey onto the global stage as a stable, emerging market, and a healthy portion of Turkish citizens still think highly of the prime minister.
So why all this unrest?
Turkey’s most common source of instability comes from straddling the line between a more liberal, secular state and a more conservative, Islamic country. Unlike many of the Turkish youth who ignited these protests, Erdogan most closely fits the latter mold, as witnessed by his recent pursuit to limit alcohol consumption, past attempt to criminalize adultery and regular insertions of religious remarks during public speeches. In addition to these hurdles, Turkey hosts a large Alevi population, a minority Muslim sect with more than 10 million followers in Turkey, and the government refuses to recognize the religion’s legitimacy. (The large Kurdish population historically represented another source of violence and instability until its leadership recently struck a peace deal with Erdogan’s administration). And despite its quick climb out of the economic dumps, Turkey still suffers from a significant wealth gap, and The Economist reports recent signs of stagnation in the economy.
Despite these qualms, the Turkish protests cannot be so easily cataloged as a battle of religiosity or a duel between liberals and conservatives. Rather, the protests united Islamists, secularists, minorities and majorities alike to call for a check on Erdogan’s increasingly autonomous rule. On top of trying to advance a polarizing religious agenda, the prime minister has also proposed various unpopular new construction projects, including the new shopping mall in Taksim, a new airport and a new bridge next to the historic Galata Bridge. Turkish citizens also complain about Erdogan’s foreign policy, specifically what they see as over-involvement in a Syrian conflict that culminated in an attack on Turkish soil that killed nearly 50 and injured dozens more civilians.
Thus, while each city’s protest often symbolized a unique grievance, Erdogan’s over-handed politics and police retaliations gave a united front for conservatives, secularists, minority sects, ethnicities, gays and environmentalists. Turkish President Abdullah Gul captured the symbolism of the Turkish protests perfectly when he stated that democracy was more than showing up to the ballot box; these protesters were calling on Erdogan to represent the will of the people, both minorities and majorities alike. With tens of thousands of citizens participating in protests around the country, the movement sent a clear warning to Erdogan that members of the new generation have moved past the awe of independence era and now demand their freedom to protest, pray and pursue happiness as they please.
Despite the great significance of these movements, Erdogan remains prime minister and largely unchallenged politically. Just because he maintains the title, however, doesn’t mean Erdogan retains the same power. His response to the protests (which included his calling protesters “thugs,” blaming an international conspiracy and accusing protesters of working with terrorists) tainted his reputation among the international community, and various heads of state who once considered Erdogan an ally in the region have become more distant. The United States, for one, has taken a step back from its close coordination with Turkey in attempts to bolster the Syrian rebels. The European Parliament went so far as to pass a resolution condemning Erdogan for his inappropriate response, and German Chancellor Angela Merkel unilaterally halted negotiations on Turkey’s long-sought-after membership bid for the EU. Reports from Israel also hint at a backing off from recent attempts at reconciliation after three years of hostility following Israel’s attacks on a Turkish flotilla in 2010.
The most direct hit to Erdogan, however, remains the challenge to his plans to run for president against incumbent Abdullah Gul. Because Justice and Development Party (AKP) rules forbid Erdogan for running for a fourth term, the 2014 presidential elections are Erdogan’s only chance to maintain executive power. While the current presidency is more a ceremonial role than a political one, Erdogan has proposed constitutional amendments to expand the power of the presidency to include the ability to dissolve parliament and appoint cabinet members. Not only will such a reach for power likely spur another wave of protests, but a recent Turkish poll reveals a slip in Erdogan’s approval rating and a boost in that of President Gul: More than two-thirds of respondents cited President Gul as the country’s most favorable current political figure.
The roots of democracy are spreading in Turkey, challenging all branches of government to live up to 21st-century standards. And while Erdogan will remain in a position of power for the foreseeable future, he faces a critical crossroad: recognize public opinion as a legitimate voice, or continue ruling in an increasingly autocratic style and risk shedding more political power in both the domestic and international arenas.
Dina Shahrokhi is a research associate for the Middle East at the Baker Institute. Shahrokhi previously worked as a project coordinator at the United Nations Works and Relief Agency for Palestine Refugees in Damascus. She lived and worked in Syria during the first year of the revolution from 2011 to 2012. Shahrokhi’s research currently focuses on U.S. policy in Syria, and she is a regular contributor for Syria Deeply, where she hosts a weekly column that focuses on life in Syria before and after the revolution. Follow her on Twitter at @dshahrokhi.