Miguel Treviño. Courtesy of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (cc-by-sa).
Yesterday’s arrest of Mexican drug cartel Los Zetas leader Miguel Treviño (Z-40) could be profound for Mexico. On the one hand, it sets an important precedent that no one is above the law, not even the leader of one of the nation’s most powerful organized crime groups. On the other hand, Z-40’s removal may portend increased violence as new leadership figures vie for power within the organization and rivals pounce on perceived vulnerability.
The arrest of Z-40 is indicative of the Peña Nieto administration’s violence targeting strategies, which are a continuation of the policies of the second half of the Calderón administration. As a presidential candidate, Peña Nieto campaigned on the counterviolence strategies — heavy targeting by the state of the most violent organizations in order to minimize violence among all trafficking groups — that are in place today. Yesterday’s arrest also demonstrates the continued potency of the Mexican Navy when it comes to capturing or killing kingpins or high-value targets, giving the military branch an important place in the counterviolence calculus.
Zetas History in Brief
The Zetas were originally recruited from a Mexican Special Forces (GAFES) unit as enforcers for the Gulf cartel in the late 1990s. Initially, former GAFES members comprised only a small number of the Zeta total membership, but as new members were recruited, they were trained in military tactics techniques and procedures. This diffusion of tactics became known as the “Zeta effect.”
When Gulf leader Osiel Cardenas Guillen was arrested, Los Zetas began developing as an independent force within the cartel. By the time Cardenas was extradited to the United States in 2007, they were effectively independent. By 2010, Los Zetas and the Gulf carter had formally split. Violence in Monterrey, Mexico’s northern industrial hub, spiked thereafter as these two trafficking organizations vied for control.
Last October, Zeta head Heriberto Lazcano was killed by Mexican marines, and leadership passed to Treviño. Observers in Monterrey reported some increased violence and insecurity during this period, but confounding variables including the transition to a new presidential administration make it difficult to identify a causal relationship between the Zetas power transition and regional violence.
The Zetas have become notorious for their use of violence, both in the course of their business operations and as a mechanism to communicate power. As I argued in my dissertation, this cartel is a territorial, profit-seeking, illicit network; that is, a high proportion of their profits come from the taxation of their territory through extortion, kidnapping, prostitution and the trafficking of migrants. Ledgers obtained by InSight Crime confirm this analysis:
“Internal financial ledgers of the organization obtained by InSight Crime show a group that buys small quantities of cocaine in Guatemala and other parts of Central America, and spends high amounts on personnel and weapons.”
Because of this business model — which varies drastically from the model of more “transactional” trafficking-oriented groups such as the Sinaloa cartel — there tend to be higher levels of violence in areas under Zeta control, particularly when the areas are contested.
Analysis: What Z-40’s capture means for violence levels in northern Mexico
Treviño’s capture should be viewed in the broader context of Mexican drug trafficking structures. As I have argued before, while the number of trafficking groups has risen following the employment of kingpin strategies by the Calderón administration, drug trafficking in the country has settled into a bipolar structure. On one side is the Sinaloa cartel and those in its sphere of influence: the Caballeros Templarios, the Arellano Felix Organization remnants, the Cartel Nuevo Generacion de Jalisco and the Gulf cartel. On the other side are the Zetas and their allies, the Beltran Leyva Organization and the Carillo Fuentes Organization. Viewed in this light, the loss of Treviño is a significant victory for the Sinaloa cartel and especially its ally, the Gulf cartel.
Treviño’s arrest could mean that rival lieutenants will vie for control of the Los Zetas network, which spans from Central America throughout much of eastern Mexico and includes clandestine networks in the United States. If the network faces a succession crisis, we could see increased violence. If successors are in place (observers believe Treviño’s brother will immediately take his place), we will not see increased violence until further high-value targets are arrested. In my analysis in Trends in Organized Crime, I noted that many high-value targets were arrested over a long period of time before a succession crisis and internecine conflict was triggered within the Arellano Felix Organization in 2008. Thus, violence due to internecine conflict may be less worrisome than other potential effects.
More troubling for short-term violence may be the response of rivals to the arrest of Treviño. If the Sinaloa cartel and its allies, notably the Gulf cartel, sense weakness within the Zeta network, we are likely to see increased violence in the short term, particularly in northeastern Mexico. While some analysts last year assumed the Gulf cartel was on the verge of death, others such as Southern Pulse noticed this year that the organization appeared resurgent in cities like Monterrey. If the Gulf cartel is feeling sufficiently consolidated to take on the Zetas, we may see increased short-term violence. That said, if the Gulf cartel were to significantly dislodge the Zetas, we would likely see reduced long-term violence because of the Gulf cartel’s model of focusing on drug trafficking over taxing their territory.
Nathan Jones is the Alfred C. Glassell III Postdoctoral Fellow in Drug Policy at the Baker Institute. His areas of interest include U.S.-Mexico security issues, illicit networks and cross-border flows. Follow him on Twitter at@natejudejones.