Syrian rebels from the “Al-Qasas Brigade” or “Justice Brigade” run through an olive grove to avoid Syrian Army snipers as they travel between villages on foot in the northwestern Jabal al-Zawiya area. Credit: Some rights reserved by Freedom House (cc-by-2.0).
Well, President Obama has decided that the United States will start providing small arms to the Syrian rebels. The decision, though carefully hedged, marks an important step towards growing U.S. involvement in the Syrian civil war. As readers of my blog posts will know, I don’t believe this a particularly wise move. A large majority of the American public — 70 percent by a recent Pew poll — agree with me. The push for U.S. military involvement in Syria is, by and large, an elite phenomenon, driven by interventionists, conservative and liberal alike, in our foreign policy establishment. I should stress that this disconnect between Washington and most Americans says nothing, one way or the other, about the wisdom of involving ourselves more deeply in the Syrian conflict. In any case, public opinion may well change. Should the United States escalate our military role — for instance, by imposing a no-fly zone over all or parts of Syria — we might well see a “rally around the flag” effect and growing support for U.S. intervention.
The reasons for the Obama administration’s decision? Official spokespersons have made much of the Syrian government’s purported use of chemical weapons. But press reports – notably this one in the New York Times — suggest that President Obama could simply no longer resist growing pressure, from inside his foreign policy team and from outside it, to do something about the bloodshed in Syria. The recent announcement that two prominent “liberal interventionists,” Samantha Power and Susan Rice, would be taking senior positions in the administration probably had little to do with the decision, which is apparently the result of months of internal and external lobbying for greater U.S. involvement. There is some speculation that Bill Clinton’s criticism of Obama’s Syria policy, made just a few days before the announcement, may have goaded the president into action. Administration spokespersons, unsurprisingly, dismiss the idea. (American presidents, Democratic and Republican alike, never base foreign policy decisions based on political pressure; they always act from conviction and a careful calculation of the national interest. Believe that, friend, and there’s a bridge I’d like to sell you in Brooklyn.)
What now? President Obama still appears extremely hesitant to widen the scope of U.S. involvement in Syria. Imposition of a no-fly zone is particularly problematic. It would mark direct U.S. military involvement in an ugly civil conflict that is shaping up as a proxy war pitting Sunni vs. Shiite around the Middle East. Given Russian opposition, a no-fly zone is unlikely to receive formal UN sanction, though some sort of legal justification could no doubt be found. (Finding such fig leaves is what State Department lawyers are for.) But, having yielded on small arms, President Obama will be pressed to “up the ante” by those urging more U.S. support for the rebels. As I’ve noted elsewhere, I am not a great fan of “slippery slope” arguments. Providing small arms to Syrian rebels today does not inevitably lead to a no-fly zone tomorrow. But I doubt President Obama has bought himself much time. The drumbeat for more military intervention will continue and perhaps intensify.
One final note. Foreign Affairs commentator Daniel Drezner has caused a bit of a kerfuffle in the foreign policy blogosphere by asserting that the president’s decision to arm the rebels is part of an administration strategy to prolong the Syrian civil war. The logic: the longer the conflict goes on, the greater the costs imposed on Iran and Hezbollah, which are both supporters of the Assad regime and regional adversaries of the United States. Drezner’s theory is not ridiculous on its face. Great powers have been known to attempt to weaken their opponents by drawing them into protracted, costly conflicts. Our support for the mujahedeen during the Soviet Union’s occupation of Afghanistan was driven, at least in part, by such a consideration. But I just don’t see much evidence for Drezner’s claim, interesting as it is. The announcement of small arms shipments to the rebels appears less an element of grand strategy than a short-term fix to a short-term problem. Sometimes the obvious, even banal, explanation is the right one. I believe that the Obama administration’s announcement on arming the Syrian rebels is a case in point.
Joe Barnes is the Baker Institute’s Bonner Means Baker Fellow. From 1979 to 1993, he was a career diplomat with the U.S. Department of State, serving in Europe, Africa, the Middle East and South Asia.