Mexican presidential candidate Enrique Peña Nieto
At a House of Representatives subcommittee hearing on June 20, Congressman James Sensenbrenner accused leading Mexican presidential candidate Enrique Peña Nieto of “a reversion” to the old policies of “turning a blind eye to the cartels” because of his proposal to fight drug-related violence in lieu of drug trafficking. Until now, the four candidates in Mexico’s presidential race have been vague on security policy, generally talking about reducing violence in the so-called “drug war.”
The accusation clearly riled Peña Nieto, who said the Republican congressman had a “lack of knowledge,” and declared himself “unwavering” in the fight against organized crime, according to the Associated Press.
Actual proposals
Peña Nieto — who is currently polling at 38 percent, a commanding lead in a four-way race — has offered some specific proposals that give us insight into the strategic orientation of Mexico’s proposed new security policy.
He envisions the creation of a paramilitary force of 40,000 former soldiers that would bridge the gap between the heavy military force needed to fight large drug trafficking organizations and the police function needed to respect civilian rights. An obvious criticism is that this force will take time to build and train, leaving the military as the primary tool against organized crime. Mexico has had many federal law enforcement reorganizations since the 1980s and none have addressed the important security needs of the country.
Peña Nieto, as leading presidential candidate and de facto PRI leader, has also announced that upon taking office as president, he would appoint the former Colombian chief of police, Oscar Naranjo, as an adviser on national security issues. Naranjo was credited with building up the intelligence apparatus of the Colombian national police and coordinating with the United States to defeat the Medellin and Cali cartels in 1993 and 1995, respectively. He also presided over the police during some of Colombia’s greatest security gains under President Alvaro Uribe’s Democratic Security Strategy between 2002 and 2010.
Peña Nieto has voiced support for a “mando unico,” or single hand for police in Mexico. Mexico has more than 450,000 police officers, but because they are in a diffuse array of agencies that do not coordinate with each other, they range from good to extremely bad. However, creating a single national police force risks destroying good local police forces, which have proven successful in reducing violence in places like Tijuana.
The above proposals, combined with high levels of drug-related violence in Mexico, paint a picture of a security policy that will increasingly look like Colombia’s in the 1990s. As in Colombia, Mexico’s sovereignty concerns about U.S. assistance have eroded as people and elites feel more pain from drug-related violence. One of the keys to Colombia’s success was U.S. training and capacity-building in the national police force and military.
Misinformed … but useful
In reality, a violence-reduction strategy will likely focus more on violent crimes and violent criminal groups like Los Zetas (known for kidnapping and extortion), than on counternarcotics interdiction. Sensenbrenner’s comments, while inaccurate, may have had a salubrious effect on Peña Nieto and his party. Some PRI officials have suggested that they know how to manage drug traffickers through negotiations, as they did during their 70-year authoritarian rule of Mexico. It should be noted that Peña Nieto has never suggested this is his policy. Sensenbrenner’s comments in the run-up to the Mexican presidential election in July have forced Peña Nieto to publicly reject a policy of collusion with traffickers to reduce violence. Those public rejections send an important signal to those “dinosaurs” of the old political regime that collusion is an unacceptable policy.
Nathan Jones is the Alfred C. Glassell III Postdoctoral Fellow in Drug Policy at the Baker Institute. His areas of interest include U.S.-Mexico security issues, illicit networks and cross-border flows.