Did the attacks of September 11, 2001, change U.S. foreign policy?
Yes. And much for the worse.
In retrospect, declaring a “war on terror” — however explicable in the panic of the period — was an error of vast consequences. It elevated Al Qaeda into a rival of the United States, rather than reducing it to a criminal conspiracy. From the outset, we should have attempted to lower, not raise, the status of Al Qaeda and similar groups. Declaring a war on terror also played directly into the hands of those, in the Western and Islamic worlds alike, who saw the conflict in terms of a clash of civilizations. Nothing, of course, could have pleased Muslim radicals more; they had long argued that the West was an implacable, existential threat to Islam. Declaring war on terror also created its own inevitable disappointment. Wars can be won only if there is an enemy — a country, an army or even a group — to be defeated. The war on terrorism’s enemy is, by definition, no concrete foe, but rather a technique — a deadly and despicable one, perhaps, but a technique all the same. Eradication of terrorism around the globe is simply impossible. There will always be an angry individual somewhere willing to kill civilians in order to make a political point. You might as well declare war on … well, drugs. We all know how well that’s turned out. Most unwisely of all, however, by couching our efforts against Islamic extremists as war, we made it all the easier to embark on other wars, most notably our invasion of Iraq.
The precise relationship between the attacks of Sept. 11 and the decision to invade Iraq is complex. Purported links between Al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein’s regime were among the (many) reasons used to justify the invasion; as it turned out, the links were either exaggerated or simply false. More broadly, the general atmosphere created by the attacks — one, at great oversimplification, of fear and anger — played directly into the hands of those in Washington who had long wanted oust Saddam Hussein from power.
The human and financial cost to Iraqis and Americans alike of our “adventure” in Iraq has been terrible. Our invasion has also been a strategic fiasco. It diverted resources from Afghanistan during a period when we might have gained a quick victory; nearly a decade later, we are still attempting to pacify Afghanistan, with no end to our involvement in sight. The Iraq invasion also increased the power of Iran in the Persian Gulf; Tehran can now look to a sympathetic fellow Shiite government in Baghdad. Not least, our invasion of Iraq helped create a new generation of terrorists (in Iraq and elsewhere) highly hostile to the United States.
Sept. 11, 2001, was a terrible day for the victims, for the friends and families, for all those who watched the twin towers fall in shock, horror and grief. But the day’s lasting damage to U.S. foreign policy has been, alas, self-inflicted.
Joe Barnes is the Baker Institute’s Bonner Means Baker Fellow. From 1979 to 1993, he was a career diplomat with the U.S. Department of State, serving in Europe, Africa, the Middle East and South Asia.