Courtesy of NASA/MSFC
Concept image of the Ares V Earth departure stage in orbit, shown with the Orion capsule docked with the Altair lander.
As outlined in a recent Baker Institute blog post, lofty endeavors — such as the human exploration of the moon and Mars — are important vehicles for discovery that also generate a wake of scientific and technological advancement. However, the impassioned declaration of an ambitious goal is but one aspect of a successful “moon shot,” given the numerous social, political and economic factors that are at play.
The Apollo era is one of the most awe-inspiring periods in the history of our country, though our involvement in space was fundamentally provoked by the Cold War (and specifically Sputnik). It was this pressure to succeed that allowed Apollo to consume more than two-thirds of NASA’s expenditures in 1966 at a time when the agency’s budget was nearly twice what it is today (when adjusted for inflation).
Nearly 40 years later, President George W. Bush would evoke the spirit of President John F. Kennedy in promoting his goal to return humans to the moon and ultimately on to Mars. The Constellation program was to outfit us with a new lunar lander, a fresh fleet of rockets and the Orion crew capsule, which would be capable of taking us to other worlds. Due in part to a lack of public interest and political support, this plan would be prematurely ended in 2010.
To understand what happened and give context as to where our space agency stands today, let us consider an oversimplified history of Constellation:
[Early in 2004]
Bush: Let’s set up shop on the moon. I’ll get you an extra $1B over the next five years, and you guys get us there by 2020.
NASA Administration: We’ve got a lot on our plate with the shuttle and space station, but you’re the boss so let’s give it a shot.
[Fast forward a few years]
NASA Spaceflight Program Managers: It doesn’t look like we’re going to get all of that money we were promised, and it’s becoming more and more costly to keep the shuttle safe.
NASA Administration: It seems that we’re in quite the predicament. OK, siphon funds out of research and development and get those rockets built, like, yesterday.
Externally Funded Scientists and Engineers: Can they just take our money away like that? If so, I don’t want to do business with these people.
[Fast forward to 2010]
Obama: Didn’t we go to the moon 40 years ago? Let’s cut our losses and start working toward something more ambitious.
Congress: Not so fast. Are we supposed to just throw out all of this technology that we spent billions on?
Obama: OK, fine. Repurpose the capsule as a lifeboat for the International Space Station and scrap everything else except the heavy lift rocket so we can get it and other stuff into orbit after the space shuttles are grounded. Deal?
Congress: Deal.
NASA Administration: How do you expect us to be able to afford any of this when we are forced to continue wasting money on Constellation because Congress can’t pass a budget?
While there is certainly more to the story, the fact remains that today we are left with a bunch of half-built rockets, nothing but a prototype of a spacecraft and an otherwise fractured space agency. How did it get this bad?
Bold plans are great for technological innovation and patriotism, but they are driven by more than bravado. Spaceflight requires an enormous amount of infrastructure and coordination, and it is incredibly difficult to change direction once you have set a course. This is even more problematic when not building off of existing (e.g. space shuttle) technology, as billions can be wasted in planning, retrofitting facilities and hiring/firing personnel if things do not work out.
Furthermore, dealings in space come with their fair share of hazards. Apollo was an extremely risky endeavor for the time. After the very-public Challenger and Columbia accidents, NASA is under considerable pressure to perform each and every mission without incident. The extensive qualification protocols for all aspects of spaceflight today make it even more difficult to keep costs down.
There are also ancillary issues that threaten NASA’s future prosperity. Examples include a lack of a cohesive plan to protect interplanetary travelers from the deadly effects of space radiation and the fact that the 112th Congress is waging a war on discretionary spending, even proposing that NASA cannibalize other critical programs for the sake of saving manned spaceflight in the short term.
Suffice it to say, the odds are not in NASA’s favor.
Without pressure from the public to expedite missions in space, Congress is unlikely to increase NASA’s budget significantly in the near future. By setting goals that are commensurate to the funding level that the agency can expect to receive in the future, Obama has established a “slow and steady” course for U.S. manned spaceflight.
Further, I am hopeful that his plan to direct funds back to research and development will again attract up-and-coming scientists and engineers to the space program — as was the case during the Apollo era. The technological advancements from this investment will ultimately enable the missions that will inspire the youth of tomorrow.
It may not seem like a grand plan, but I’d rather have a functioning space agency than not have one at all.
Brent Carey is a graduate intern for the Baker Institute Science and Technology Policy Program working under the supervision of Kirstin Matthews, Ph.D. Brent is working on a Ph.D. in applied physics with Pulickel Ajayan, Ph.D., and plans to graduate in 2011.