America wants a secure cyberspace, but its intelligence agencies have found enormous utility in using their own computer-hacking capabilities to collect confidential information from foreign adversaries. At issue is how the U.S. government can push for global cybersecurity and, at the same time, use cyber means to collect intelligence on potentially threatening regimes such as Iran. In an article of mine that was just published by the journal of the National Military Intelligence Association, I wanted to inject some thought to debate on how altruistic the United States can be on a secure cyberspace when it may benefit enormously from the insecurity of others’ information networks.
U.S. Sen. Joseph Lieberman again introduced a comprehensive cybersecurity bill in the Senate earlier this month. The issue identified in it is that of protecting the vitally important digital networks that make so much of the national infrastructure. Yet, there remains an enormous vacuum in policy as to how America’s intelligence agencies, many of whom are charged with roles is securing cyberspace under the Lieberman bill, can continue to use clandestine cyber means in collecting intelligence, or even engaging in covert action against other countries and transnational groups. This is an issue that needs consideration and input not just within Washington political circles, but far beyond the Beltway, including firms in Silicon Valley and other tech centers around the U.S.
There are many items to consider, and a preponderance of them will soon be falling upon the desk of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s newly installed cyber coordinator, Christopher Painter. Cyber statecraft is indeed real and matters. Anyone dismissing the Internet’s impact on international politics as inconsequential appears tone deaf, however there is a hyping of Twitter and Facebook in driving the revolutionary movements now breaking out across the Middle East that may be counterproductive to the productive discourse. (See just how little consensus the experts hold on what Web 2.0 even means by reading the Keen-Weinberger debate.)
What are we going to see? Well, anyone painting a clear picture should face significant critique. However, we can be sure that the world’s militaries and intelligence agencies are fashioning cyber weapons that might take down power grids, disable command-control networks or even disrupt the function of centrifuges employed to enrich nuclear fuel. In addition, corporations, nongovernmental organizations and governments are figuring out how to make their case via the participatory Web parts (Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and others) and gain influence and communicate messages on a global scale. There are now hard and soft power elements at work in cyber statecraft.
The days of the Internet being a curiosity on the global political stage are over, and perhaps the most important question now is to what degree the aspiring democrats of the Middle East will come to equate Facebook, Twitter and Google with the State Department, CIA and NSA.
Christopher Bronk is the Baker Institute fellow in information technology policy. He previously served as a career diplomat with the United States Department of State on assignments both overseas and in Washington, D.C.