Official White House Photo/Pete Souza
President Obama talks with members of his Middle East Policy team in the Oval Office, Sept. 1, 2010.
From the beginning, I’ve had my doubts about the most recent round of Israeli-Palestinian talks. The circumstances hardly seem propitious. The Palestinians are hopelessly divided, with one major faction, Hamas, absent from the negotiations and prepared to use violence to scuttle them. The Israeli government is weak, with Prime Minister Netanyahu presiding over a fractious and fragile right-wing coalition; and the Obama administration is apparently pursuing the same cautious, step-by-step approach to the peace process that has failed in the past. I support the negotiations on the general principle that talking is better than its alternative, which, all-too-often, is violence. I also have immense respect for the key architects of U.S. strategy for the negotiations, George Mitchell and Dennis Ross. (Full disclosure: I once worked for Ross.) But I remain unconvinced that the current talks are going to succeed.
Recent weeks have not made me any more optimistic. The Israeli government – despite a generous package of incentives offered by the Obama administration – has refused to extend a moratorium on expanding settlements on the West Bank. As he repeatedly promised before talks began, Palestinian President Abbas suspended his participation when the moratorium lapsed.
In recent days, the Israeli government has further muddied the waters. First, the cabinet endorsed a bill that would require non-Jewish applicants for Israeli citizenship to pledge loyalty to a “Jewish and democratic” Israel. Then it authorized the construction of new buildings in East Jerusalem. The proposed loyalty oath affects only a small number of individuals, mainly the spouses of Arab Israelis. It is certain, however, to be perceived as an insult – and a particularly gratuitous one – by Arabs. East Jerusalem was never included in Israel’s moratorium on settlements; nonetheless, the Israeli government had suspended new construction there because of U.S. pressure.
Perhaps Prime Minister Netanyahu — as some suggest — is merely shoring up his support on the political Right to prepare the way for Israeli concessions that will be a necessary part of any settlement. I hope so. But I’m far from certain. Netanyahu’s support for a two-state solution is both recent and begrudging. In addition, he may have been emboldened by the Obama administration’s unwillingness – or inability – to bring any significant pressure to bear on his government. When it came to a moratorium on expanding settlements, it was the President of the United States, not the Prime Minister of Israel, who blinked first.
Let’s hope that talks resume. There may be a way to finesse the end of the moratorium by an Israeli commitment that limits new construction to settlements likely to be retained by Israeli under any agreement. But the events of the last week are going to make an already difficult task even harder.
Joe Barnes is the Baker Institute’s Bonner Means Baker Fellow. From 1979 to 1993, he was a career diplomat with the U.S. Department of State, serving in Europe, Africa, the Middle East and South Asia.