Recent shootings at a movie theater in Colorado, a Sikh temple in Wisconsin and the Empire State Building, as well as the Operation Fast and Furious controversy, have revived debate about the role of guns in our society. In a series of blogs this week, Baker Institute experts discuss gun control, Texas gun running, and why the political conversation about guns is unlikely to change anytime soon.
The series marks the second installment of Baker Institute Viewpoints, which offers multiple views of a complex issue. Leading off for Viewpoints today is nonresident drug policy fellow Gary Hale, the former chief of intelligence for the Houston field division of the Drug Enforcement Administration. Hale suggests focusing on corruption at the border as a way to target Texas-to-Mexico gun running. On Aug. 30, Tony Payan, visiting Baker Institute Scholar for Immigration and Border Studies, will discuss why U.S. gun policy remains static, despite the recent high-profile killings. Nathan Jones, Alfred C. Glassell III Postdoctoral Fellow in Drug Policy, wraps up the series on Aug. 31 with a look at widely varying media accounts of Operation Fast and Furious.
Congress recently released a report on the U.S. government’s controversial Fast and Furious “gun-walking” investigation, severely criticizing the Justice Department for allowing criminals to smuggle hundreds of firearms into Mexico. While the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives was experimenting with gun-running in Arizona, it concurrently reported that Houston is the No. 1 spot of origin for weapons that have been traced from Mexican organized crime scenes back to the United States. Yet, no federal undercover operations have been reported in Texas, a state that makes up two-thirds of the U.S.-Mexico border and that shares numerous bi-directional, land-based ports of entry with Mexico. It’s obvious that we’ve been going about this the wrong way.
Admittedly, a significant number of weapons found at the scene of Mexico’s firefights do originate in the U.S. However, blaming the U.S. for being the cause of crime and death in Mexico is an easy way to deflect attention from the admission that weapons control should be a shared responsibility — it is no different than sharing responsibility for the drug trade that enriches criminals on both side of the border.
Regardless of origin, weapons used by Mexican criminals are not the cause of the crime problem but rather they are the means by which those criminals are able to carry out their violent acts. As a result, whether or not the Arizona sting operation had merit (in that it attempted to track weapons headed south), it missed the target by a long shot, rhetorically speaking.
Putting aside the fact that the Fast and Furious operation was flawed from the start, there has never been a bilateral weapons control program in place that takes into account the social aspects of the weapons supply chain reaching into Mexico, regardless of the point of origin. Such a program would place a greater emphasis on ensuring that a corrupt subset of Mexican Customs officials is not allowing weapons smugglers to bring guns into Mexico.
One aspect of the problem that is rarely discussed is the corruption along the weapons supply chain, and the need to address this problem. As an example, a supply chain security expert based in Laredo, Texas, recently explained to me how Mexican cartels intervene with legitimate southbound trade by tracking shipments and collecting taxes, or cuotas, from exporters.
In a series of confidential emails to me, the expert indicated that a cartel lookout, taking notes on a pad of paper, stands on the Mexican side of one of the many Texas-Mexico international bridges to collect data on products carried on the flatbeds and other vehicles that enter Mexico daily.
At the end of the day, the criminals tally up the exports and collect cuotas from U.S.-based exporters. In cases where there is an import into Mexico that has not been made known to the cartels (because the lookouts didn’t recognize the trucking company or shipper), the expert said, the lookouts radio ahead to notify corrupt Mexican Customs officials, who allow the driver to be pulled over and have the imports seized by the cartels.
According to the expert, the cuota tax collection system applies to goods that range from the commercial shipments noted above, to personal contraband (called fayuca) driven into Mexico in personal cars, to pirated movies and music (called pirateria) brought in from China by the thousands in maritime containers. This taxation extends to and includes the importation of illegal drugs, chemicals, weapons or any item that crosses into Mexico from any port of entry, whether it is a Pacific maritime port, a riverine port on the border with Guatemala or a land-based port on the U.S.-Mexico border, the expert said.
The criminal cuota system is successful because of the control that cartels have over corrupt authorities via money or intimidation, the expert said. The lack of specific and focused attention on these activities at Mexican ports of entry demonstrates the naïveté of government officials, who fail to identify and focus on a critical node in the criminal supply chain that can successfully exploit both nations.
Anti-corruption programs an important component to the success of controlling cartel weapons imports into Mexico. Targeting corruption at Mexico’s ports of entry would make more sense as a weapons control program than did ATF’s Fast and Furious — and should be a focus of the incoming Peña-Nieto administration and the U.S. government as both nations seek to restore security and reduce violence in Mexico.
Gary J. Hale is the nonresident fellow in drug policy at the Baker Institute. From 2000 to 2010, he was chief of intelligence in the Houston Field Division of the Drug Enforcement Administration. From 1990 to 1997, Hale had various assignments in Washington, D.C., including serving as chief of the Heroin Investigations Support Unit, chief of the Dangerous Drugs Intelligence Unit and liaison to the National Security Agency. During this period, he also served a tour of duty at the U.S. Embassy in Bogotá, Colombia. From 1997 to 1998, Hale was assigned as the DEA intelligence chief at the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City.